Efficient and Secure ECDSA Algorithm and its Applications: A Survey by Al-Zubaidie, Mishall et al.
1Efficient and Secure ECDSA Algorithm and its
Applications: A Survey
Mishall Al-Zubaidie1,2, Zhongwei Zhang2 and Ji Zhang2
1Thi-Qar University, Nasiriya 64001, Iraq
2 Faculty of Health, Engineering and Sciences,
University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD 4350, Australia
Abstract: Public-key cryptography algorithms, especially
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm (ECDSA) have been attracting attention
from many researchers in different institutions because these
algorithms provide security and high performance when being
used in many areas such as electronic-healthcare, electronic-
banking, electronic-commerce, electronic-vehicular, and
electronic-governance. These algorithms heighten secu-
rity against various attacks and the same time improve
performance to obtain efficiencies (time, memory, reduced
computation complexity, and energy saving) in an environ-
ment of constrained source and large systems. This paper
presents detailed and a comprehensive survey of an update
of the ECDSA algorithm in terms of performance, security,
and applications.
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1. Introduction
Public key encryption algorithms such as elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) and elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm (ECDSA) have been used extensively in many
applications [1] especially in constrained-resource envi-
ronments due to the effectiveness of their use it in these
environments. These algorithms have appropriate effi-
ciency and security for these environments. Constrained
resource environments such as wireless sensor network
(WSN), radio frequency identifier (RFID), and smart
card require high-speed, low consumption ability, and less
bandwidth. ECC has been considered to be appropriate
for these constrained-source environments [2]. These al-
gorithms provide important security properties. For ex-
ample, ECDSA provides integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation. ECDSA has been proven to be efficient
in its performance because it uses small keys; thus the
cost of computation is small compared with other pub-
lic key cryptography algorithms, such as Rivest Shamir
Adleman (RSA), traditional digital signature algorithm
(DSA) and ElGamal. For example, ECDSA with a 256-
bit key offers the same level of security for the RSA algo-
rithm with a 3072-bit key [3, 4]. Table 1 [5, 6, 7] shows
a comparison of key sizes for public key signature algo-
rithms.
The preservation of efficiency and security in the ECDSA
is important. On one hand, several approaches have been
developed to improve the efficiency of the ECDSA algo-
rithm to reduce the cost of computation, energy, memory,
and consumption of processor capabilities. The opera-
tion that consumes more time in ECC/ECDSA is the
point multiplication (PM) or scalar multiplication (SM).
ECC is used PM for encryption and decryption, while
ECDSA is used this operation to generate and verify the
signature [8]. One can improve the PM efficiency by im-
proving finite field arithmetic (such as inversion, multi-
plication, and squaring), elliptic curve model (such as
Hessian and Weierstrass), point representation (such as
Projective and Jacobian), and the methods of PM (such
as Comb and Window method) [9]. Many researchers
have made improvements to the PM to increase the per-
formance of the ECC/ECDSA as we will see in Section
4.
On the other hand, the security improvement in ECDSA
is no less important than its efficiency because this algo-
rithm is designed primarily for the application of security
properties. ECDSA, like previous algorithms, may pos-
sibly suffer from some of the security vulnerabilities such
as random weak, bad random source [1] or leaking bits of
the private key. Also, many researchers have made im-
provements to close security gaps in the ECC/ECDSA
algorithm by providing countermeasures against various
attacks. But when selecting countermeasure there should
be a balance between security and efficiency [10]. To
maintain the security of these algorithms it is impor-
tant to use finite fields (either prime or binary) recom-
mended by credible institutions such as the Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard (FIPS) or National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). The choice of ap-
propriate curves and finite fields according to the author-
itative organizations’ standards leads to secure ECDSA’s
implementations [11]. Therefore, we note from the above
that any encryption algorithm or signature should pos-
sess a high performance and security level.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our contribution in this survey is to provide an updated
study of three important parts in ECC/ECDSA. These
items can be summarized as follows:
• Presenting a study on the efficiency of ECC/ECDSA
in terms of speed, time, memory, and energy.
• Investigating the security problems of the
ECC/ECDSA and countermeasures.
• Giving a description of the most important applica-
tions that use ECC/ECDSA algorithms.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides basic concepts and general informa-
tion about ECC and ECDSA algorithms. Section 3 de-
scribes existing surveys about ECC/ECDSA. Efficiency
improvement on ECDSA algorithm is presented in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we will show the security improve-
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2Table 1. Keys sizes and some information for public key algorithms
Algorithm Keys sizes Ratio Author(s) Year
Mathmatical
problem
Other
algorithms
RSA
Rivest,
Shamirand,
and Adleman
1978
Integer
factorization
Rabin
Elgamal Taher Elgamal 1985
DSA
1024 2048 3072 7680 15360
David W.
Kravitz
1991
Multiplicative
group
Schnorr,
Nyberg-Rueppel
ECDSA 160-223 224-255 256-383 384-511 512-more
1:6-30
Scott Vanstone 1992
Elliptic curve
discrete log.
(ECDLP)
ECIES
ment on ECDSA algorithm through using countermea-
sures against attacks. The ECDSA applications are de-
scribed in Section 6. Finally, we will present the conclu-
sion and future work on this survey in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries of ECDSA
In this section, we will present fundamentals about ellip-
tic curve cryptography (ECC) and basic concepts of the
ECDSA algorithms.
2.1 ECC
ECC has been used to encrypt data to provide confiden-
tiality in the communications network with limited ca-
pacity in terms of power and processing. This algorithm
was independently proposed by Neal Koblitz and Victor
Miller in 1985 [12]. It depends on the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) which is impervious to different attacks
when selecting parameters accurately [13], i.e difficulty
obtaining k from P and Q ( where k is integer and, P and
Q are two points on the curve). Small parameters used
in ECC help to perform computations quickly. These
computations are important in constrained-source envi-
ronments that require processing power, memory, band-
width or power consumption [7]. ECC provides encryp-
tion, signature and keys exchange approaches [12]. Many
operations are performed in ECC algorithms (shown in
four layers) as shown in Figure 1 [14].
ECC uses two finite fields (prime field and binary field).
The binary field uses two types to represent basis ( nor-
mal and polynomial basis) [7], and is well suited to imple-
mentation in hardware [14]. Let Fq indicates field type,
if q=p (where p > 3) then ECC uses prime field (Fp).
In the second case, if q=2 then ECC uses binary field
(F2m) where m is the prime integer [15]. ECC consists
of a set of points (xi, yi), where xi, yi are integers and
the point at infinity (O) provides an identity for Abelian
group rule that satisfies long form for Weierstrass equa-
tion (with Affine coordinate).
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (1)
When prime field is used over ECC, the simplified equa-
tion is as follows:highlighted
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2)
Where a, b ∈ Fp, 4a3+27b2 6= 0(modp). The law of chord-
and-tangent is used in ECC to add two points on the
curve. Let us suppose that P and Q are two points on the
curve; these two points have coordinates (x1, y1), (x2, y2)
respectively and the sum of these two points is equal to a
new point R(x3, y3) (i.e P (x1, y1)+Q(x2, y2)=R(x3, y3))
[7]. ECC uses two operations for addition that are point
addition(P+Q) and point doubling (P+P ) (Figure 1), as
in the following equations:
In the case of the point addition (P +Q) where P and Q
∈ E(Fp):
Algorithm 1 ECC encryption and decryption algo-
rithm:
1: Alice and Bob use same parameters domain D =
{a, b, q,G, n, h}, where a, b are coefficient, q is field
type, G is base point, n is order point and h is cofac-
tor.
2: Alice selects random integer dA as private key.
3: Alice generates public key Q = dAG and sends Q and
G to Bob.
4: Bob receives message m from Alice, selects random
integer as private key dB where dB ≤ n.
5: Bob encrypts message m with point P in elliptic
curve E(Fq).
6: Bob computes C1 = P + dBQ, C2 = dBG and sends
C1 and C2 to Alice.
7: Alice receives Bob’s message and decrypts the mes-
sage by computing C1 − dAC2 to obtain plaintext.
with using the slope λ = y2−y1x2−x1
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = λ2(x1 − x3)− y1 (3)
In the case of the point doubling (P + P ) where P ∈
E(Fp):
with using slope λ =
3x21+a
2y1
x3 = λ
2 − 2x1, y3 = λ2(x1 − x3)− y1 (4)
When the binary field is used over ECC, the simplified
equation is as follows:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (5)
Where a, b ∈ F2m , b 6= 0 [7], as addition operations are in
the following form:
In the case point addition (P + Q) where P and Q ∈
E(F2m):
with using the slope λ = y1+y2x1+x2
x3 = λ
2 +λ+x1 +x2 +a, y3 = λ(x1 +x3) +x3 +y1 (6)
In the case point doubling (P + P ) where P ∈ E(F2m):
x3 = x
2
1 +
b
x21
, y3 = x
2
1 + (x1 +
y1
x1
)x3 + x3 (7)
ECC operations for encryption and decryption are ex-
plained through the algorithm 1 [16].
2.2 ECDSA
ECDSA algorithm is used to warrant data integrity to
prevent tampering with the data. This algorithm was
proposed by Scott Vanstone in 1992. Data integrity of
the message is important in the networks because the
attacker can modify the message when it is transferred
from source to destination [17]. Many organizations use
it as standard such as ISO (1998), ANSI (1999) and,
IEEE and NIST (2000) [7]. This algorithm is similar to
the digital signature algorithm (DSA), where both algo-
rithms depend on the discrete logarithm problem (DPL),
3The first layer
cryptographic
protocol
The second layer
elliptic curve
point mul-
tiplication
The third layer
point operations
The lower finite
field arithmetic
ECC (ECIES,
ECDSA
and ECDH)
Point multipli-
cation (PM)
Point additioin Point doubling
Multiplication Addition Squaring Inversion
Figure 1. Arithmetic operations in ECC hierarchy
but ECDSA algorithm uses a set of points on the curve
and the generating keys are small. ECDSA algorithm
with key length 160-bit provides the equivalent for sym-
metric cryptography with a key length of 80-bit [17]. It
is dramatically convenient for devices with constrained-
source because it uses small keys and provides compu-
tation speed in the signature [18]. Moreover, four point
multiplication operations used in ECDSA algorithm: one
is in public key generation, one for signature generation
and two for signature verification [19]. In addition, this
algorithm consists of three procedures: key generation,
signature generation, and signature verification. These
operations are explained as follows:
• Key generation:
1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer d in
the interval [1, n− 1].
2 Compute Q = dG
3 Public key is Q, private key is d.
• Signature generation:
1 Select a random or pseudorandom integer k, 1
≤ k ≤ 1.
2 Compute kG = (x1, y1) and convert x1 to an
integer x¯1.
3 Compute r = x1 mod n. If r = 0 then go to
step 1.
4 Compute k−1 mod n.
5 Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string
to an integer e.
6 Compute s= k−1(e + dr)mod n. If s = 0 then
go to step 1.
7 Signature for the message m is (r, s).
• Signature verification:
1 Verify that r and s are integers in the interval
[1,n-1].
2 Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string
to an integer e.
3 Compute w = s−1 mod n.
4 Compute u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n.
5 Compute X = u1G+ u2Q.
6 If X = θ then reject the signature. Otherwise,
convert the x-coordinate x1 of X to an integer
x¯1, and compute v = x¯1 mod n.
7 Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
ECDSA algorithm becomes unsuitable for signing mes-
sages (integration) if used poorly and incorrectly. Valida-
tion of domain parameters is important to ensure strong
security against different attacks. This algorithm be-
comes strong if the parameters are well validated [20, 21].
The authors’ recommendations are to update the valida-
tion scheme.
2.3 ECDSA Implementations on Constrained
Environments
The performance and security presented by ECDSA al-
gorithm, make it suitable for use in several implemen-
tations on WSN, RFID, and smart card. Digital signa-
tures in ECDSA have better efficiency in devices with
constrained-resource than DSA and RSA. Many authors
have pointed to the possibility of using ECDSA with en-
vironments constrained-resource (memory, energy, and
CPU capability). In the following Subsections, we will
explain using ECDSA with these implementations.
2.3.1 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
A WSN consists of a group of nodes that communicate
wirelessly with each other to gather information about a
particular environment in various applications [22]. This
network often has restricted sources such as energy and
memory. Therefore, a WSN needs efficient algorithms
to reduce the complexity of the computation in order to
increase the length of the network lifetime. In addition,
it requires a high level of security to prevent attacks.
Several researchers have investigated the use of ECDSA
algorithm in WSN and explained that ECDSA is conve-
nient for WSN.
For example, Wander et al. [23] presented a study in
energy for the public key cryptography (ECC/ECDSA,
RSA) on sensor node Mica2dot with Atmel ATmegal
128L (8bit). They found that transmission cost is double
the receiving cost. They analysed signatures in ECDSA
with a key of bit-160 and RSA with a key of bit-1024,
signature verification cost in ECDSA is larger than a
signature generation while RSA verification is smaller
than a signature generation. They noted that ECDSA
has less energy cost than RSA. They concluded that
4ECC/ECDSA is more effective than RSA and feasible
in constrained-source devices (WSN) because it gener-
ates small keys and certificates with same security level
in RSA. Also, implementation was applied for 160-bit
ECC/ECDSA and 1024-bit RSA algorithms on sensor
node MICAz [24]. The authors used hybrid multiplica-
tion to reduce access memory. ECDSA results on MI-
CAz are signature generation=1.3s and signature veri-
fication = 2.8s. For the purpose of comparison, the au-
thors implemented ECDSA also on TelosB, where MICAz
results were slightly less than TelosB’s results. The au-
thors proved the possibility of using RSA and ECDSA
on WSN. In addition, ECDSA (SHA-1) and RSA (AES)
were analysed in several types of sensor nodes (Mica2dot,
Mica2, Micaz, and TelosB) in terms of energy and time
[25]. ECDSA uses short keys (160-bit), which reduces
memory, computation, energy and data size transmitted
and thus is better than the RSA. De Meulenaer et al.
[26] discussed the cost evaluation of energy (communi-
cation, computation) on the WSN (TelosB and MICAz)
through the Kerberos key distribution protocol (symmet-
ric encryption) and ECDH-ECDSA key agreement pro-
tocol (asymmetric encryption). They noted that TelosB
sensor node consumes less power than MICAz and Ker-
beros performs better than ECDH-ECDSA. Moreover,
Fan and Gong [27] implemented ECDSA on Micaz motes
with the binary field (163-bit). They improved signature
verification via cooperation idea of the adjacent nodes.
Also, ECDSA’s implementation was presented in sensor
node (IRIS) [28], but because this node supports 8-bit of
the microcontroller the author modified the SHA-1 code
from 32 bits original to 8 bits. Through implementation,
the original algorithm is better in size and time than a
modified algorithm. The author explained the possibility
of using ECDSA algorithm with the sensor node (IRIS)
held 8-bit microcontroller.
Recently, researchers in [29, 30] have applied the ECDSA
algorithm as a light-weight authentication scheme in the
WSN. This demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency
of using ECDSA in WSN in terms of security and per-
formance.
2.3.2 Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID)
Another implementation of ECDSA is Radio Frequency
Identifier (RFID). RFID is one of the technologies used
in wireless communication. This technology has been
used significantly in various fields, but it suffers from
constrained-resources such as area and power. Therefore,
many researchers considered ECDSA algorithm to be the
best choice in RFID tags because ECDSA is not required
to store private/public keys as in symmetric cryptogra-
phy algorithms.
The hardware’s implementation of ECDSA algorithm has
been widely used on RFID technology [31]. Authors have
used ECDSA algorithm to authenticate the entity. They
have applied this algorithm to the prime field (Fp160) ac-
cording to SECG standards. They accelerated multipli-
cation algorithm by combining integer multiplication and
fast reduction. Through implementation, they get good
results in reducing chip area and power consumption
(860µw in 1MHz). They concluded that ECDSA com-
putation requires 511864 clock cycles. Also, Hutter et al.
[32] proposed ECDSA processor with RFID tag. This
processor has security services (authentication, integrity,
and non-repudiation). Authors used this processor to
authenticate between tag reader and RFID tag. They
used several countermeasures to prevent side channel at-
tacks such as Montgomery ladder algorithm, randomized
Projective coordinate and k randomness through SHA-
1. Through results, the computation cost of the signa-
ture in this processor is 859188 clock cycles (127ms at
6.78 MHz) and the area is 19115 GE. Implementation of
ECDSA algorithm is presented with prime field (Fp160)
on RFID [33]. Authors exchanged SHA-1 hash algorithm
with KECCAK hash to reduce running time in ECDSA
on RFID. Also, they used a fixed-base comb with w=4
to accelerate and reduce hardware requirements. Results
show that their scheme gets an area of 12448 GEs, power
consumption 42.42 µw in 1MHz and signature generation
is less than 140 kcycles. With these results, their scheme
competes with other schemes for the binary and prime
fields.
Recently, the ECDSA with password-based encryption
in [34] has been adopted to improve security and privacy
in RFID. Authors pointed out that lightweight processes
performed by ECDSA in data signing are significantly
effective in RFID. Also, Ibrahim and Dalkılıc¸ [35] used
ECDSA with the Shamir scheme to secure RFID technol-
ogy. They applied the Shamir scheme to reduce the cost
of two scalar multiplications to one. Finally, ECDSA has
been implemented to secure RFID in IoT applications
in [36] have implemented. Authors proposed a shopping
system, during the analysis and evaluation, arguing that
ECDSA is suitable to sign users requests in the shopping
system.
2.3.3 Smart Cards
A smart card is a novel way for authentication as it con-
tains important information for users. This technology is
used by several algorithms to implement authentication
mechanisms, such as RSA, DSA and ECDSA. ECDSA
algorithm is used in this area largely because of the ad-
vantages found in ECDSA.
The design and implementation of ECC/ECDSA algo-
rithms have been investigated and they are used in
constrained-source devices like smart cards [12]. The
authors used a java card that supports the java lan-
guage and the environment used is next generation in-
tegrated circuit card (NGICC). Results showed that
the ECC/ECDSA is better than RSA. The results also
pointed to the possibility of using these algorithms in the
other wireless devices constrained-source. Moreover, the
EC algorithms (ECDSA and ECDH) with pairing were
used on a Java card [37]. ECC requires little data to
move between the card reader and the card, compared
with the RSA. Furthermore,Savari and Montazerolzo-
hour [38] concluded that the ECC/ECDSA algorithm is
more efficient in terms of power, storage and speed than
RSA on the smart card. On the other hand, Bos et al.
[1] discussed using ECDSA with Austrian e-ID (smart
card). They noted that ECDSA uses the same keys many
times; therefore, they pointed to improved randomness in
ECDSA. In 2017, Dubeuf et al. [39] discussed the security
5risks of the ECDSA algorithm when applied to a smart
card. They proposed the development of a scalar oper-
ation algorithm when applying the Montgomery ladder
method in ECDSA. They described that ECDSA offers
a security solution for their smart card implementations.
3. Existing Surveys
In this section, we will present the existing surveys in
ECC/ECDSA. In this survey, we will focus on a study
to many of the aspects of ECC/ECDSA algorithm. To
start with beginning, we will present these articles and
then explain the difference between our research and
existing studies. Table 2 lists existing surveys for the
ECC/ECDSA algorithm.
• Performance and efficiency
First of all, in [40] performance and flexibility have
been investigated in the ECC algorithm with accel-
erators through hardware implementations. Many
points in hardware implementations for ECC were
discussed such as selecting curves, group law, PM
algorithms, and selection of coordinates. In ad-
dition, it was pointed out that the architecture
of multiple scalar multiplication in ECDSA’s ver-
ification should supported because this architec-
ture leads to efficiency in hardware’s implementa-
tions. Much research has pointed out that using
hardware’s accelerators leads to high performance,
but it sacrifices flexibility, where reduction circuits
should be used to retrieve the flexibility feature.
Similarly, Driessen et al. [17] compared many dif-
ferent signature schemes (ECDSA, XTR-DSA, and
NTRUSing) in terms of energy consumption, mem-
ory, keys length and signature, and performance.
Through implementation, the authors found that
NTRUSing algorithm is the best in term perfor-
mance and memory. However, NTRUSing algorithm
suffer from security weakness against attacks.
• Security and countermeasures
A detailed study in [41] on attacks and countermea-
sures in ECC algorithm is presented. The authors di-
vided attacks to passive and active attacks. They ex-
plained that the countermeasure for a specific attack
may be vulnerable to other attacks, whereas counter-
measures should have been selected carefully. There-
fore, the authors have made some recommendations
in selecting countermeasures. Some surveys have
studied public cryptography algorithms in terms of
computation of hard problems (integer factorization
problem(IFP), discrete logarithm problem (DLP),
lattices and error correcting codes) in quantum and
classical computers [42]. The authors described
RSA, Rabin, ECC, ECDH, ECDSA, ElGamal, lat-
tices (NTRU) and error-correcting code (McEliece
cryptography), as they pointed out that ECC pro-
vides a higher security level than other cryptosys-
tems; in addition, it presents advantages such as high
speed, less storage, and smaller keys sizes. But they
did not discuss the use of ECC/ECDSA in applica-
tions and implementations of different technologies.
Meanwhile, the authors in [43, 10] explained physi-
cal attacks on ECC algorithms, where they focused
on two known physical attacks: side channel analysis
(SCA), and fault attacks. They also described many
attacks including these two types, as they presented
countermeasures against these attacks such as sim-
ple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA) and fault attack (FA) countermeasures. Also,
some recommendations were presented for counter-
measures that add randomness, countermeasures se-
lection, and implementation issues. However, none
of these papers investigated non-physical attacks on
public key signature algorithms such as ECDSA.
• Implementation and applications
A study on security techniques has investigated wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs) [44]. It focused on
three features in WSN security: key management,
authentication, and secure routing. This study
pointed out that ECC algorithm was convenient for
constrained-resource devices. In addition, a survey
on attack strategies was given in relation to ECC
and ECDSA algorithms in Bitcoin and Ethereum
[45]. The author pointed out that different standards
for curves (such as ANSI X9.63, IEEE P1363, and
safecurves), where this survey focused on safecurves
with SECP256k1 through using ECDSA, as this pa-
per referred to safecurves as one of the strongest
curves standards. The author suggested many ba-
sic points to prevent attacks on ECDSA or ECC.
Finally, Harkanson and Kim [6] compared RSA and
ECC/ECDSA, and pointed out that ECC/ECDSA
exhibited the highest performance with the same
level of security from RSA. They noted that 69%
of websites use ECC/ECDSA, 3% used RSA and
the rest used other algorithms. They also described
ECC with some applications (such as vehicular com-
munication, e-health and iris pattern recognition).
However, they had a duplication between implemen-
tation and application. For example, RFID is a tech-
nology that can be used to implement a particular
application.
In our survey, we study the ECDSA algorithm differently
to previous studies. First, we integrate three aspects (ef-
ficiency, security, and applications) into one search. Sec-
ond, systematically, we provide different details (ECDSA
aspects) of previous studies. Finally, we provide an up-
dated explanation of all these aspects in ECDSA.
4. Efficiency Improvement on ECDSA
In this section, we will discuss the improvement of
ECDSA’s efficiency in many ways such as scalar multi-
plication, coordinate system, and arithmetic operations.
In each subsection, successive improvements to several
authors will be explained.
4.1 Efficiency Improvement of Scalar Multi-
plication
This section includes many strategies to improve scalar
multiplication; these are efficient in terms of scalar repre-
sentation, curve operations, and ECDSA arithmetic op-
erations.
6Table 2. Different between existing surveys and our research
Paper Contribution of existing surveys Aspect Year
[40] Efficiency and flexibility in hardware implementations Efficiency 2007
[17] Compared many different signature schemes 2008
[41] Attacks and countermeasures Security 2010
[42] Hard problems in public cryptography algorithms 2011
[43, 10] SCA and fault attacks, and countermeasures 2012,2013
[44] Security techniques in WSN Applications 2015
[45] Attack strategies in Bitcoin and Ethereum 2016
[6] ECC/ECDSA with some applications 2017
This
work
Classification of efficiency, security methods and applications with
updated contributions
Efficiency
Security
Applications
4.1.1 Representation Improvement of the
Scalar
In this section, we explain the scalar representation meth-
ods on scalar multiplication. Implementation of scalar
multiplication take a large amount of time [46, 19] in
ECDSA and ECC algorithms. Scalar multiplication takes
more than 80% for running time in operation of key com-
putation in sensor devices [13, 47]. Scalar multiplication
(SM) or point multiplication (PM) is a set of point addi-
tion (P +Q) and point doubling (P + P ) that generates
kP (where k is a large integer and P is a point on the
curve) through P + P ...(k-times)[48, 49]. Representa-
tion of 25 points in traditional double-and-add (D&A)
method presents as the following [50].
AA 25P = 2(2(2(P+2P )))+P
Or
AA 25P = 2(2(2(2P )+P ))+(2(2P )+P )
The efficient and fast implementation of ECC algorithm
and its derivatives are needed to accelerate SM imple-
mentation [51]. As we can see from step 5, signature
verification in ECDSA algorithm requires 2 scalar mul-
tiplications (u1G+ u2Q) [52] that require operation of a
complexity computation. SM uses three operations: in-
version, squaring and multiplication (where it takes the
notation i, s and m respectively) that is considered ex-
pensive for an ECC algorithm [48]. These operations
are used to evaluate SM efficiently through implemen-
tations. When using the Affine coordinate system with
SM, both point doubling and point addition consume 2
multiplications, 1 squaring and 1 division operation in
field [48]. Improving on SM leads to reduce computation
cost, and running time and thus improve the efficiency
of performance in ECC algorithm and its derivatives.
The traditional method (double-and-add algorithm) in
scalar multiplication uses base 2 in point doubling such
as 2(...(2(2P ))) in addition to point addition [48]. In this
method, point doubling is implemented in each bit in k
(where k is integer scalar and represented in binary form)
while point addition is implemented when bit equal ”1” in
k [52]. Improving SM makes these algorithms convenient
for constrained-source devices such as WSN, RFID, and
smart card [14] through reducing of running time and
energy consumption. Many researchers have presented
methods to represent scalar in order to reduce computa-
tion complexity in kP . Many representations have used
for SM such as traditional method (double-and-add),
double base chain (2,3), multibase representation ((2,3,5)
and (2,3,7)) and point halving (1/2P ). All these repre-
sentations lead to shorter representation length of terms
and hamming weight. For instance, multibase represen-
tation (2,3,5) is shorter terms length and more redundant
than a double base chain (2,3). Representing 160-bit in
multibase representation (MBNR) needs 15 terms while
double base chain (DBNR) needs 23 terms [50]. Some-
times, improving on methods of SM representation may
bring storage problems, for example, using point halving
instead of point doubling with polynomial base requires
greater storage in memory [53]. In the following subsec-
tions, we will discuss methods to improve the represen-
tation of scalar in SM.
4.1.1.1 Double-Base Chain (2,3)
One of the methods used to develop doubling (2P ) is
tripling (3P ). This method was proposed to use bases
2 and 3 to reduce the execution time of the PM. Ciet
et al. [54] proposed a point tripling operation (3P ) and
mixed it with point doubling (2P ) depending on various
methods to evaluate 2P + Q when 1 inversion is more
than 6 multiplications that lead to improving tripling.
They presented a comprehensive evaluation through i, s
and m for operations types: P + Q, 2P , 2P + Q, 3P ,
3P +Q, 4P , 4P +Q. The authors noted that 2P +Q is
faster than P+(P+Q) but 2P+Q has slightly more cost.
They used the idea of Eisentra¨ger et al. [15] in removing
y3 from equations when computing 2P +Q; the authors
used this idea with 3P + Q and removed y4 when 1i is
more than 6m to reduce computation cost. Their results
proved that this scheme improved SM efficiency in ECC,
ECDSA and ECDH. Double-base chain equation is
k =
∑
i
si2
bi3ci (8)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci) are integer numbers and bi
and ci decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0 and
c1 > c2...cm > 0). Furthermore, characteristic 3 was in-
vestigated with both Weierstrass and Hessian forms [11].
The authors pointed out that characteristic 3 is efficient
in Weierstrass form, where tripling operation performs
more efficiently than double and add, while character-
istic 3 is not efficient with Hessian form (Triple-and-add
(T&A) used with Weierstrass and double-and-add(D&A)
used with Hessian). In addition, the scalar in the dou-
ble base number system algorithm (DBNS) is analysed
on superlinear EC in characteristic 3 [55]. Double-base
chain is DBNS but with restriction doubling and tripling
and increasing the number of point addition through a
Horner-like manner. The authors proposed sublinear SM
algorithm for PM (i.e. sublinear in scalar’s length) with
running time O( log nlog log n ), and it is faster than D&A and
T & A. They pointed out that their algorithm is ap-
propriate to use with large parameters in EC, where se-
lecting large parameters leads to improving performance
7and security. Also, Dimitrov et al. [56] proposed double-
base chains method through prime and binary fields, us-
ing point tripling with a Jacobian coordinate in prime
fields, and quadrupling combined with quadruple-and-
add with an Affine coordinate in binary fields. They
used a modified greedy algorithm to convert k to DBNS
form. Also, they applied the same idea that was used in
Eisentra¨ger et al. [15] to evaluate only x-coordinate in
computation 2P + Q but with 4P + Q to increase SM
efficiency. Through results, the authors have become ef-
ficient in speeding SM better than classical D&A (21%),
NAF (13.5%) and ternary/binary (5.4%) in binary fields.
In prime fields, their scheme also gets better results than
D&A (25.8%), NAF (15.8%), 4NAF (6%). But results in
[54] are better than this scheme in term inversions (with
binary fields) in the computation case 4P and 4P+Q,
where their scheme obtains for 4P (2[i] + 3[s] + 3[m])
and for 4P+Q (3[i] + 3[s] + 5[m]). Results in [54] are
4P (1[i] + 5[s] + 8[m]) and 4P+Q(2[i] + 6[s] + 10[m])
where squaring is free and ignored in binary fields, while
their scheme is better than [54] when using prime fields.
4.1.1.2 Multibase Representation (2,3,5)
Multibase representation is a method to improve SM
through using a point quintupling (5P ). It uses 3 bases
(2,3,5) called step multibase representation(SMBR).
Multibase representation algorithms are shorter terms,
more redundant, and have more sparseness than DBNS
algorithms. For instance, representation 160-bit costs
23 terms in bases representation (2,3) whereas 15 terms
in representation bases (2,3,5). SMBR equation is pre-
sented as follows:
k =
∑
i
si2
bi3ci5di (9)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci5di) are integer numbers and
bi,ci and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm >
0, c1 > c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). Mishra and
Dimitrov [57] used SMBR with Affine in binary fields
and Jacobian in prime fields similar to the scheme in
[56]; therefore, their scheme is a generalization for [56]
but with 3 bases. They improved on a greedy algorithm
(mgreedy) in order to fit SMBR and to gain shorter rep-
resentation and faster running. Moreover, they recom-
mended using small values for exponents because it does
not affect cost. Computation of 5P was efficient with the
prime field through 2(2P ) +P and 2P + 3P . They found
that 2(2P )+P costs 9s+17m (with Affine ) and 14s+20m
(with Jacobian) while 2P + 3P costs 22m+12s (with
Affine) and 26m+16s (with Jacobian). Moreover, compu-
tation of 5P efficiency with the binary field (Affine) was
1i+5s+13m. Through these results, the authors achieved
efficiency in SM with prime and binary fields better than
previous algorithms such as D&A, NAF, 3-NAF,4-NAF,
ternary/binary and DB chains whether with precompu-
tation or without precomputation points. Finally, Longa
and Miri [58] concluded that the cost of 5P + Q is 26m
+ 13s.
4.1.1.3 Multibase Representation (2,3,7)
Multibase representation is a scalar representation
method, which depends on base triple bases to accel-
erate point multiplication. It uses 3 bases (2,3,7) and
is called multibase number representation(MBNR). This
representation is the development of previous represen-
tation methods (DBNR (2,3) and SMBR (2,3,5)). Puro-
hit and Rawat [50] proposed triple base method (binary,
ternary and septenary) with addition and subtraction.
The greedy algorithm was used to convert an integer
to the triple base (2,3,7), through finding the closest
integer to a scalar. Their evaluation referred to this
method as having better results than previous methods
of scalar representation. They pointed out that septu-
pling (7P ) costs is less than two formulas (2(2P ) + 3p
and 2(3P ) + P ), where 7P=3i + 18m, 2(3P ) + P=4i +
18m and 2(2P )+3P= 5i + 20m. Also, squaring cost was
neglected, regarded as inexpensive in the fields with char-
acteristic 2. MBNR representation was applied through
the following equation:
k =
∑
i
si2
bi3ci7di (10)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci7di) are integer numbers and
bi,ci and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm >
0, c1 > c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). MBNR (2,3,7)
is better than MBNR (2,3,5) in terms of shorter terms
length, more redundant and spare. The next example
gives a comparison between using quintaupling and sep-
tupling when points number= 895712 as mentioned in
[50].
(usingquintaupling)
243752 + 243551 + 243450 + 213450 + 203250 + 203150
(usingseptupling)
293571 + 273371 + 253171 + 253170
This method presents efficiency in scalar multiplication
better than previous representation methods, where we
note from the previous example that septupling is more
redundant and has fewer terms than quintupling. Also,
Chabrier and Tisserand [59] proposed MBNR (2,3,5,7) to
represent scalar without precomputation. They investi-
gated the costs in their method when a = -3, the cost is
18m + 11s (prime field). The results of their proposal in-
dicate high performance in FPGA implementations with
SM at high speed with storage level and execution time.
4.1.1.4 Point Halving with DBNR and
MBNR Representations
This section will discuss point halving (PH) first, then
bases (1/2,3), (1/2,3,5), and (1/2,3,7) respectively. Point
halving method is one of the methods used to reduce the
cost of point doubling. It means extract P from 2P [48].
Knudsen [53] and Schroeppel [60] separately proposed
point halving in order to accelerate point multiplication.
They wanted to reduce the cost of computation com-
plexity in point doubling. Point halving was suggested
to use instead of all point doubling, where point halving
is faster than point doubling in the case of using Affine
coordinate on the curve (minimal two-torsion) [53]. This
method was implemented on the binary field (polyno-
mial and normal). Both polynomial and normal basis
perform fast computations, but polynomial basis suffers
from storage problem. This scheme neglected squaring
operation and evaluation as it depends on inversion and
8multiplication. To implement point halving on binary
field in curve, the following equations were used to get
Q = 2P , where P = (x, y) and Q = (u, v):
λ = x+
y
λ
(11)
u = (λ)2 + λ+ a (12)
v = x2 + u(λ+ 1) (13)
Through previous equations, we get point halving; the
second equation gives us λ value, the third equation
gives us x and subsequently uses values of x, λ to get
y value from the first equation. Fong et al. [61] pre-
sented analysis and comparison between SM methods
(point doubling and point halving) and used binary fields
(F2163 and F2233) through reduction polynomials of tri-
nomial and pentanomial (using polynomial basis instead
of normal) on standards of NIST’s FIPS 186-2. Through
analysis, they found that point halving is faster (29%)
than point doubling when P is known in advance. Also,
they noted τ -adic (Frobenius Endomorphism) used in
[62] faster than PH. They presented a comparison be-
tween double-and-add and halve-and-add (H&A) over
F2163 through Affine and Projective coordinate systems.
Also, they pointed out that point doubling can use with
mixed coordinate while point halving must be used in the
Affine coordinate. They explained that signature verifi-
cation in ECDSA has 2 SM and this operation is expen-
sive when P is known. But performing ECDSA verifica-
tion with halving is more efficient than doubling in ad-
dition to halving being better for constrained-resources
in the case assumption that storage is available. Ismail
et al. [48] mentioned that point halving is faster than
point doubling by 5-24%.
Point halving (1/2P ) is combined with DBNR (2,3)
in [52] to reduce computation complexity and to in-
crease operations efficiency of scalar multiplication in
ECC/ECDSA. The authors implemented their scheme on
Pentium D 3.00 GHz using C++ with MIRACL library
V 5.0 that deals with a large integer. Equations of scalar
representation in this scheme are:
k′ = 2qmodp (14)
Where 2q a large integer and value it close to field size.
k = k′/2q =
∑m
i=1 si2
bi3ci
2q
=
m∑
i=1
si(1/2)
q−bi3ci (15)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci) are integer numbers and bi
and ci decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm > 0 and
c1 > c2...cm > 0). The authors showed a comparison be-
tween their scheme results and DBNR with using the
binary field (163-bit, 233-bit, and 283-bit) and prime
field (192-bit) according to NIST’s standards. Their
scheme achieved better results than an original double-
base chain, their results reduced 1/2 inversion, 1/3 squar-
ing and few number of multiplication and that led to im-
proving DBNR in scalar multiplication.
In addition, Ismail et al. [48] presented improving on
SMBR method through using point halving with SMBR.
The original algorithm used bases (2,3,5) while the mod-
ified algorithm used (1/2,3,5). The modified scheme
adopted point halving and halve-and-add instead of point
doubling and double-and-add. It applied the following
equation:
k = k′/2q =
∑m
i=1 si2
bi3ci5di
2q
=
m∑
i=1
si(1/2)
q−bi3ci5di
(16)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci5di) are integer numbers and
bi,ci and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm >
0, c1 > c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). The
greedy algorithm is used to convert an integer to modified
MBNR. The authors referred to MBNR (2,3,5) and mod-
ified MBNR(1/2,3,5) as having the same terms but costs
in modified MBNR (i=7,s=17,m=77) were less than orig-
inal MBNR (i=15,s=36,m=80) with k = 314159. Some-
times, the original algorithm has fewer terms than the
modified MBNR, but modified algorithm remains less
costly in operations(i,s,m). The modified and original
algorithm are applied on different curves sizes (163, 233,
283), where each curve is tested with 100 random num-
bers. Results refer to modified scheme of less computa-
tion cost (30%) rather than the original scheme (2,3,5).
The authors in [51] proposed combining point halving
with MBNR (2,3,7). They used bases (1/2,3,7) instead
of (2,3,7). This scheme is less costly than schemes that
have bases (2,3,5) and (2,3,7). Also, this scheme is used
with the binary field. The authors referred to MBNR as
being convenient for ECC because of its shorter represen-
tation length and less hamming weight. MBNR (1/2,3,7)
representation uses the following equation:
k = k′/2q =
∑m
i=1 si2
bi3ci7di
2q
=
m∑
i=1
si(1/2)
q−bi3ci7di
(17)
Where si is ±1, and (2bi3ci7di) are integer numbers and
bi,ci and di decreased monotonically (b1 > b2...bm >
0, c1 > c2...cm > 0 and d1 > d2...dm > 0). This scheme
presents improvement in the performance of scalar mul-
tiplication through reducing computation complexity.
Through these results, the authors pointed out that their
scheme reduced inversion to 1/2, and squaring to 1/3 and
there were fewer numbers of multiplication when com-
pared with previous schemes. Table 3 shows the costs of
arithmetic operations to represent scalar.
4.1.2 Methods of Improving Curve Opera-
tions
In this section, we describe the methods which are used to
improve the PM by reducing the addition formula opera-
tions (point addition and point doubling). In the second
part, we explain that some research efforts have used the
different methods for first part methods.
4.1.2.1 Improvement Via Various PM Meth-
ods
Many approaches can be used to improve PM meth-
ods because the PM operation consumes a large amount
of time from ECC and ECDSA algorithms. Many re-
searchers have presented different methods to improve
the performance of basic PM algorithm (D&A) such as
NAF, Window, Comb, Montgomery, Frobenius. In this
section, these algorithms will be elaborated. Table 4
shows improvements on SM methods.
9Table 3. Costs of inversion (i), squaring (s), and multiplication (m) for scalar representation
Binary field Prime Field
Scalar representation
i s m i s m
1/2P - - 1 - - -
1/2 P + Q 1 - 5 - - -
P +Q 1 1 2 1 1 2
2P 1 1 2 1 1 2
2P + Q 1 2 9 1 2 9
3P 1 4 7 1 4 7
3P + Q 2 3 9 2 3 9
4P 1 5 8 1 9 9
4P + Q 2 6 10 2 4 11
5P 1 5 13 - 10 15
5P + Q - - - 1 13 26
7P 3 7 18 - 11 18
7P + Q - - - 1 22 28
1/2 & DBNR DBNR/2 DBNR/3
Slightly lower
than DBNR
DBNR/2 DBNR/3
Slightly lower
than DBNR
1/2 & SMBR SMBR/2 SMBR/3
Slightly lower
than SMBR
SMBR/2 SMBR/3
Slightly lower
than SMBR
1/2 & MBNR MBNR/2 MBNR/3
Slightly lower
than MBNR
MBNR/2 MBNR/3
Slightly lower
than MBNR
Algorithm 2 The D&A algorithm
Input: point P on E(Fp); l-bits scalar k = (kl−1...k0)2
Output: Q = k.P
Q = P
for i = l - 2 downto 0 do
Q = 2.Q
if k(i)= 1 then Q = Q+ P
return Q
• Double-and-Add (D&A) Method
D&A is a basic algorithm in PM. It has been repeat-
edly used for two operations: point addition(P +Q)
and point doubling (P + P ). This algorithm is sim-
ilar to the square-and-multiply algorithm [13], and
depends on bits in scalar k after it was represent it
in binary form, where if bit in k has zero value, the
D&A algorithm will execute point doubling, while if
bit in k has one value, this algorithm will execute the
point doubling and point addition in each loop. In
this method, the number of point addition is a half
of the point doubling. D&A method is explained in
algorithm 2.
• Non Adjacent Form (NAF) Method
NAF is the representation of signed-digit and was in-
troduced to reduce execution time in PM; it outper-
forms D&A algorithm. It does not allow for any two
nonzero bits in scalar k to be adjacent [13, 52] and
this leads to reducing hamming weight as PM com-
putation depends on the number of zeros and bits
length in a scalar. As a result, this algorithm reduces
the number of point addition. The NAF method
is faster than the square-and-multiply method [19].
This method can reduce the number of point addi-
tion to one-third. It is represented using the follow-
ing equation:
NAF (k) =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i (18)
Where k ∈ {0,±1}, NAF method is explained in
algorithm 3 [63]. When NAF is combined with a
window through a random point in PM with the
Jacobian coordinate system, NAF can achieve an
improvement of 33.7 addition and 157.9 doubling
(with k size is 160-bit) [64]. Also, Gallant et al.
Algorithm 3 NAF algorithm:
Input: A positive integer k
Output: NAF(k)
i=0
while k ≤ 1 do
if k is odd then
ki=2−(k mod 4)
k = k − ki
else
ki = 0
k = k/2, i = i +1.
return (ki − 1, k − i− 2, ..., k1, k0).
[65] combined simultaneous multiple point multipli-
cation with left-to-right window-NAF, where they
convert form (kP ) for PM to form k1p + k2φ(p)(φ
which is Endomorphism operation). This method
improved point doubling (79 points) and point addi-
tion (38 points) that lead to improving PM to 50%
better than traditional methods with Fp160. Sim-
ilarly, Mishra and Dimitrov [57] made a compari-
son between their scheme (Quintupling) and NAF
algorithm (in addition to many NAF versions such
as NAF-3 and NAF-4). Furthermore, NAF algo-
rithm (right-to-left binary method) without precom-
putations (to use in constrained devices) was used
with the mixed coordinate system to improve PM
[9]. The author compared his algorithm with NAF
(left-to-right binary method). Results showed that
this scheme presented better performance than NAF
(left-to-right binary method). Also, Purohit et al.
[51] pointed out that multibase non-adjacent form
(mbNAF) provided a speeding up of the execu-
tion time in PM with improving scalar performance
through multibase.
• Frobenius Map Method
Some researchers have used Frobenius map algo-
rithm instead of point doubling (2P ) because Frobe-
nius map performs squaring operations τ(x, y) =
τ(x2, y2) where τ is Frobenius [62] (that is replacing
point doubling with 2 squaring), and is represented
by the following equations:
2.P = −τ2P + µτP (19)
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Algorithm 4 Frobenius with D&A algorithm:
Input: Point P , τ -adic expansion of k (kl−1, ...k0).
Output: k.P
P1 = P and P2 = 2P
for i in 0 to ( l-1) loop do
if k(i) =1 then
Q = Q+ P
else if k(i) = -1 then
Q = Q− P
P = Frobenius(P )
End loop
Where µ = ±1, and
k =
t−1τ∑
i=0
siτ
i (20)
Where si is 0 or ±1 and τ is Frobenius endomor-
phism. Scalar k value is obtained through the di-
vision repeated for s by τ [14] as in the forego-
ing equation. Algorithm 4 shows combining Frobe-
nius map instead of point doubling with D&A; this
algorithm uses addition, subtraction, and Frobe-
nius. Frobenius endomorphism (τ -adic) was com-
bined with point halving [62]. The authors used
point halving because it is three times faster than
point doubling; therefore, they used τ -and-add in-
stead of double-and-add with Koblitz curves; these
curves have useful features in acceleration kP . They
used these curves with fields sizes (k-163 bit and
k-233 bit) to standards of NIST’s FIPS in binary
fields. τ -NAF was used to reduce point addition
from n/3 to 2n/7. Results have proved that τ -and-
add based τ -NAF provides speeding 14.28% better
than Frobenius method, and in addition, it does
not require of additional memory in the case us-
ing of normal basis. Frobenius expansion method
for the special hyperelliptic curve (introduced by
Koblitz) with GLV(Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone) en-
domorphism (using fields of large characteristic) is
presented to improve the efficiency of scalar mul-
tiplication [66]. Through the results, the authors
largely improved point doubling while point addi-
tion did not improve. This scheme improved scalar
point multiplication from 15.6 to 28.3% when it was
implemented on Fpn . Reducing the time and in-
creasing performance in ECDSA algorithm is per-
formed through exchange doubling point with Frobe-
nius scheme in the PM [14]. The authors presented
ECDSA algorithm with curves of subfields Koblitz
for binary fields (key length a 163-bit). They ex-
plained that binary fields are convenient for hard-
ware implementation. This scheme achieved good
results in performance over time where key genera-
tion took time 0.2 ms, signature generation took 0.8
ms and signature verification took 0.4 ms. In ad-
dition, this scheme is suited for constrained-source
devices such as smart cards, WSN and RFID. In
2017, Liu et al. [67] submitted a study of the appli-
cation of twisted Edwards curve (considered efficient
models of ECC/ECDSA) with Frobenius endomor-
Algorithm 5 Window algorithm:
Input: point P on E(Fp), Window width w, d =
[l/w], k = (kd−1, ..., k0)2w.
Output: Q = kP .
P0 = P
Precompute: for i = 1 to 2w−1 do: Pi = Pi−1 + P
Q=0
for i = d-1 downto 0 do
Q= 2wQ
Q= Q + Pkd
return Q
phism to reduce point doubling to 50% for tradi-
tional algorithms. They used the 207-bit key (prime
field) with two hardware architectures (ASIC and
FPGA). They pointed out that their method offers
high performance, less memory, and time require-
ments compared to traditional Frobenius algorithms.
Also, they mentioned that integrating their method
with a window of 2 size would save 1/16 of the point
addition.
• Window Method (WM)
Window algorithm is intended to improve execu-
tion time in D&A method through specific window
size (terms computation in a scalar); if window size
equals one, the window algorithm is the same as
D&A algorithm. This algorithm uses precomputa-
tion for points in the case of the fixed point mul-
tiplication (FPM) and also reduced point additions
better than D&A [13, 46], as explained in algorithm
5. Wang and Li [24] used NAF and window methods
to improve performance for PM algorithm. They
found that window method is more efficient than
NAF. They used hybrid multiplication to reduce ac-
cess memory instead of multi-precision multiplica-
tion. For a practical example, ECC results on MI-
CAz is signature generation=1.3s and signature ver-
ification = 2.8s while on TelosB is signature genera-
tion=1.6s and signature verification = 3.3s. The au-
thors showed the possibility of using ECC on WSN.
Also, the variable-length sliding window was com-
bined with NAF method to reduce points addition
(PM) in ECC and ECDSA algorithms [19]. Compu-
tation complexity in PM depends on bits’ length and
zeros number in an integer. The authors divided ele-
ments in NAF(k) to two windows (non-zero and zero
windows) and also divided non-zero window to six
types in sliding window. In addition, they used co-
ordinate system (Jacobian) with point doubling and
coordinate system (Jacobian Affine) with point ad-
dition. Their results demonstrate that their scheme
is better and more efficient than NAF, wNAF and
square-multiply schemes in terms of efficient point
multiplication and time of public key generation.
• Comb Method (CM)
This method uses binary matrix (w, d) to compute
FPM efficiently, where w is row and d is column. It
was introduced by Lim and Lee and this algorithm is
case special from multi-exponentiation using Straus’
trick [68]. Comb method uses precomputation to
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Algorithm 6 Comb algorithm:
Input: A point P , an integer k, and a window width
w > 2
Output: Q = kP .
Precomputation Stage:
Compute [b(w − 1), ..., b1, b0] P for all (b(w −
1), ..., b1, b0) ∈ Zw2
Write K = (K(w − 1)||...||K1||K0) padding with 0 on
the left if necessary, where each Kj is a bit-string of
length d.
Let Kji denote the i-th bit of K
i
Define Ki = [K
w−1
i , ...,K
1
i ,K
0
i ]
Q = O
Evaluation Stage:
for i = d-1 downto 0 do
Q = 2Q,
Q = Q+ kiP
return Q
improve PM performance [13, 63]. as in algorithm
6. Comb method was modified in [69] to improve
PM through combining comb method with width-w
NAF. This method is essentially designed to reduce
the number of point addition. It has presented bet-
ter results than original comb and NAF with comb.
Also, it is used to accelerate multiple PM (kP + rQ)
in ECDSA algorithm. The authors explained that
their algorithm is convenient for devices constrained-
source (memory) when choice suited parameters for
an algorithm such as window size. It improved com-
putation complexity from 33% to 38% compared to
NAF with CM in devices constrained-sources.
• Montgomery Method
Montgomery algorithm eliminates division operation
and uses reduction operation efficiently [24]. This
algorithm was introduced by Montgomery and uses
only x-coordinate and removes y-coordinate, and
this leads to increasing PM performance.
A method introduced by Eisentra¨ger el al. has im-
proved PM’s performance with an Affine coordinate
in ECC [15]. This method eliminates field multipli-
cation in the case of using left-to-right of binary SM.
It eliminates y-coordinate in addition, doubling and
tripling operations. This scheme led to saving field
multiplication and thus achieved an improvement of
PM’s cost from 3.8% to 8.5%. For example, in order
to perform the operation of 2P + Q, authors used
form ((P +Q)+P ); also in the operation of 3P +Q,
they used (((P +Q) +P ) +P ). This trick led to the
improvement in PM operation. For instance, with
a number of points (1133044P), the cost of original
PM is 23i+41s+23m, while the cost of improved PM
is 23i+37s+19m, namely, an improvement in m and
s. Ciet and Joye [54] used Eisentra¨ger’s idea but with
3P + Q when 1i equal more than 6m to reduce the
computation cost of PM. Also, Dimitrov et al.[56]
used Eisentra¨ger’s idea but with 4P +Q to improve
the PM efficiency. Montgomery method is repre-
Algorithm 7 Montgomery ladder algorithm:
Input: A point P on E and a positive integer k =
(kl−1...k0)2.
Output: The point kP .
P1 = P and P2 = 2P
for i = l - 2 down to 0 do
if ki = 0 then
P1 = 2P1 and P2 = P1 ⊕ P2
else
P1 = P1 ⊕ P2 and P2 = 2P2
return P1
sented in algorithm 7. Saqib et al. [70] suggested
that using Montgomery algorithm depends on the
parallel-sequential manner to accelerate PM in ECC
with GF (2191) on Xilinx VirtexE XCV3200 FPG de-
vice. Their scheme improved PM’s performance to
56.44µs. They compared their scheme with previous
schemes (different H/W devices). Results showed
that this scheme presents better performance. Also,
they pointed out the balance of their scheme be-
tween memory size and time. It was suggested to
use the Montgomery algorithm with ECDSA (with
keys length 224-bit and 256-bit) that has high costs
in both computation and communication [71]. The
authors analysed time complexity, where PM con-
sumes a large amount of time from ECDSA’s time.
They pointed out that Montgomery offers better per-
formance than other algorithms in constrained envi-
ronments and mobility. Hutter et al. [47] used Mont-
gomery ladder algorithm to point multiplication in
ECC (with randomized Projective coordinate) be-
cause it provides security against several attacks and
performs all operations with x-coordinate, thereby
increasing PM performance through implementation
of ASIC processor with asymmetric cryptography
ECDSA (Fp192). In 2017, Liu et al. [72] adopted
the Montgomery method with the lightweight ellip-
tic curve (twisted Edwards curve (p159, p191, p223,
and p255)) to improve speed and balance between
memory and performance (cost of communication,
execution time, memory) as well as security require-
ment. They implemented the ECDSA algorithm on
Tmote Sky and MICAz nodes. During the imple-
mentation, they noted that their scheme offers mem-
ory efficiency which requires 6.7k bytes for a SM pro-
cess instead of 13.1 kbytes for the traditional Mont-
gomery scheme. They recommended the exact selec-
tion of ECDSA’s parameters curves and the balance
between security and efficiency requirements.
In summary, the best algorithm for PM (ECC and
ECDSA) it is fixed-base comb with w=4 in random bi-
nary curves, while in Koblitz curves it is fixed-base win-
dow TNAF (τ -adic NAF) with w=6 in case memory
is not constrained [73]. When memory is constrained,
Montgomery is the best with random binary and TNAF
is the best with Koblitz. The authors pointed out that
Koblitz curves are faster than random binary curves
(F2163 , F2233 and F2283) for NIST’s standards [73]. More-
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over, Rafik and Mohammed [13] analysed in detail the
types of SPM (scalar point multiplication) algorithms
(that are D&A, window, and comb method). Examining
the results, they concluded that the CM method is faster
than D&A and WM because the CM uses less doubling
and adding points, but this method needs more memory.
As for security, the D&A method is the best with 27%.
D&A is good at memory requirements, needs more time.
Therefore, they concluded that several concepts of SPM
in ECC algorithm (or ECDSA or ECDH) are based on
the user’s application and constrained sources. If execu-
tion time is a large, the energy consumption increases.
The authors carried out the Secure-CM and earned good
time to implement (1.57 s); as demonstrated ECC is ap-
plicable in WSN.
4.1.2.2 Improvement of Efficiency Via Other
Methods
In this subsection, we will explain a set of different ideas
from previous methods to improve ECDSA performance
through reducing consumption time in signature genera-
tion and signature verification.
A method was suggested to accelerate signature verifi-
cation in ECDSA algorithm [74]. The authors used a
number of small bits (side information (1 or 2 bits))
to specify the number of allowed points in point mul-
tiplication; through the modified algorithm, points dou-
ble was largely reduced. They implemented traditional
ECDSA algorithm and modified ECDSA algorithm on
ARM7TDMI platform processor with a finite field Fp384
by NIST, and achieved the result that modified ECDSA
verification is 40% better than traditional ECDSA. They
discovered that this changing does not affect ECDSA
standards and proved that their scheme has the same se-
curity as traditional ECDSA. Also, an addition formula
was proposed through using Euclidean Addition Chains
(EAC) with Fibonacci to avoid difficult to find small
chain [75]. The author has used a Fibonacci-and-add al-
gorithm instead of double-and-add (using Jacobian coor-
dinate and characteristic greater than 3). Some improve-
ments were added to this scheme through the window and
signed representation to improve algorithm performance.
The author has compared his scheme with many schemes
(D&A, NAF, 4-NAF and Montgomery ladder). Results
indicated that his scheme outperforms D&A only in the
case of improvement addition (window or signed repre-
sentation). In addition, the improvement of signature
verification in ECDSA is achieved through cooperating of
adjacent nodes in the computation of intermediate results
[27]. The proposed scheme used 1PM+1Add in nodes
that use intermediate results instead of 2PM+1Add as in
the original scheme. The authors analysed performance
and security in the scheme of signature verification with
many attacks (independent and collusive). They noted
that these attacks do not have a large effect on their
scheme. The modified scheme has saved energy con-
sumption 17.7-34.5% better than the traditional scheme,
as signature verification in the modified scheme is 50%
faster than the original scheme. They implemented their
scheme on Micaz motes with the finite field (F2163).
Furthermore, Li et al. [46] proposed a scheme to improve
scalar multiplication by reducing point additions. They
presented a method to generate k depend on the gener-
ation of an integer S periodically. They achieved good
results in improving point addition
√
3/4× L whereas
binary scheme (L/2). Point doubling in their scheme is
similar to previous schemes (D&A, NAF, WM). Their
scheme does not require additional memory and depends
on the growth rate of a small with bit length growth in
scalar(k). Also, it is appropriate to implement in H/W
because it needs simple operands. Because scalar multi-
plication (ECDSA) consumes a large time through pro-
cessing, that leads to power consumption [76]. The au-
thors exchanged linear point multiplication method with
their method using divide and conquer algorithm. This
algorithm uses a binary tree to quotient values and a
skew tree to reminder values, where it processes points
through parallel computation method. Results showed
that they achieved better efficiency than linear scalar
multiplication in terms of a number of clock pulses and
power consumption. In 2017, Guerrini et al. [77] have
proposed a method of random scalar that relies on the
covering systems of congruence relationships. A random
was applied in a scalar representation using mixed-radix
SM algorithm. They generated n-covers randomly with a
greedy method, depending on available memory as well as
recommended selection of a large n. Also, they pointed
out that their method is more efficient, less expensive
and incurs fewer additional expenses for arithmetic oper-
ations than the Coron’s randomization, D&A, NAF, and
wNAF methods. Table 4 shows improvements on other
SM methods.
4.2 Efficiency Improvement of Coordinate
Systems
ECDSA has to perform complex operations; these oper-
ations consume resources in constrained devices. Using
the appropriate coordinate system, could lead to reduc-
ing costs of high computation in doubling and addition
operations. The improvement of computation complex-
ity in PM depends on point representation that is con-
sidered important in curve operations [78]. Many differ-
ent coordinate systems used with these algorithms such
as Affine, Projective, Jacobian, Chudnovsky Jacobian,
modified Jacobian, and mixed. Coordinate systems are
used to represent and contribute to speeding computation
in ECC/ECDSA algorithm. There is no coordinate sys-
tem to accelerate both point addition and doubling [3].
Some coordinate systems require faster or slower com-
putation time in the point doubling and point addition
operations than other coordinate systems; for instance,
point doubling uses less computation in Jacobian while
the point addition uses more computation in the Jacobian
than Projective and Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinates.
• Using Affine Coordinate
Affine is a basic coordinate system that is used with
doubling and addition operations. This system uses
two coordinates (x, y). When point addition (P+Q)
uses the Affine system, then the cost of the result-
ing point (R) is 1 inversion, 2 multiplication and 1
squaring, while cost(R) in the case point doubling
is 1 inversion, 2 multiplication, and 2 squaring [79].
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Table 4. Improvements on different SM methods
Paper SM methods Subsequent improvements of SM (PA and PD) Field
[19] Traditional NAF 1/3 PA Fp
[64] wNAF
Random point: PA (33.7) and PD (157.9)
Fixed point: PA (30) and PD (15)
Fp160
[65]
wNAF with
Endomorphism
Roughly 50% SM Fp160
[51] mbNAF 50% SM Fp and F2m
[13] Traditional D&A PA is 1/2 PD Fp
[62]
τ -NAF
τ -NAF with PH
1/3 PA and reduce PD
2n/7 PA and reduce PD
F2m (163,233)
[66] Frobenius with GLV 28.3% SM Fp
[67]
Frobenius with
twisted Edwards curve
3n/4 PA and 1/2 PD Fp207
[46] Traditional window Reduce PA and PD compared with NAF Fp (192,256,512)
[24] Sliding window 10% better than NAF Fp512
[19]
Variable-length
sliding window
27.4% better than wNAF Fp
[13] Traditional cm
cm is less PA and PD
than wm and D&A
Fp
[69]
cm with NAF
cm with wNAF
33% SM
38% SM
Fp160
[15] Traditional Montgomery
8.5% SM
memory size (SM)=13.1k
Fp (160,256)
[56] Improved Montgomery
Prime field: 21% SM is better than Q & A
13.5% SM is better than NAF
Binary field: 25.8% SM is better than Q & A
15.8% SM is better than NAF
Fp and F2m
[54] Improved Montgomery
Reduce PA and PD in
traditional Montgomery
Fp
[70]
Montgomery with
parallel sequential
roughly 51% SM with time=0.056ms F2191
[72]
Montgomery with
twisted Edwards curve
Faster SM than traditional Montgomery
memory size (SM)=6.7k
Fp (159,191,223,255)
[74] SM with side information 40% is better than traditional verification Fp384
[75] SM with Fibonacci
Improve PA in D&A and reduce
PA cost (10%)
F2m
[27]
SM with intermediate
results
Improve signature verification (50%) F2163
[46]
SM with integer S
periodically
Improve PA (
√
3/4× L is better
than D&A, NAF, and WM
Fp (192,256)
[76] SM with binary tree Reduce SM time and complex computations F2m
[77] SM with random n-cover
Reduce SM cost is better than D&A, NAF,
and wNAF
Fp
Costly arithmetical operations in point addition and
point doubling are multiplication, squaring and in-
version. Inversion operation is much lower than mul-
tiplication operation. The Affine coordinate system
uses inversion operations [24]. Inversion operation is
required in point addition and point doubling when
using Affine coordinate. But Affine coordinate needs
fewer multiplication operations than other coordi-
nate systems such as Projective coordinate [64].
• Using Projective Coordinate
Inversion operation is dramatically expensive in
point addition and point doubling. The Pro-
jective coordinate system removes this operation
and that leads to improving PM performance in
ECC/ECDSA. This system uses three coordinates
(X,Y, Z) and Z 6=0 [79], which take formula
(X/Z, Y/Z) corresponding to Affine coordinate. The
Projective coordinate is represented as the following
equation (with prime fields) [13]:
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3 (21)
Lo´pez and Dahab also used three coordinates but us-
ing formula (X/Z, Y/Z2) and Z 6=0 corresponding to
Affine coordinate [80]. Their scheme improved orig-
inal Projective on a curve in the binary field. Fur-
thermore, Projective coordinate is used with random
binary and koblitz curves (F2163 , F2233 and F2283)
for NIST’s standards instead of Affine [73]. This
coordinate leads to significant improvement in PM
ECC and ECDSA. Then, Hutter et al. [47] used
randomized Projective coordinate through generat-
ing a randomized number on x-coordinate in base
point. Also, different coordinate systems have been
discussed, such as Projective and Affine coordinates
[13]. Through experiments, the authors found that
Projective coordinates are faster by 91% than Affine
coordinates but Projective coordinate avoids inver-
sion operation, and vice versa for the memory, while
the Projective coordinates require more memory be-
cause they use three coordinates (X,Y, Z). Oliveira
et al. [78] proposed λ-Projective coordinate through
using three coordinates (X,Y, Z) with binary field
(F2254) to improve computation efficiency in PM.
The formula used for coordinates is (X/Z,L/Z)
corresponding with λ-Affine formula, where the λ-
Affine formula is (X,X + Y/X). λ-Projective im-
proved Lo´pez and Dahab Projective(LD-Projective),
where the P+Q cost in λ-Projective is 11m+2s while
in LD-Projective it is 13m+4s. Also, 2P + Q cost
in λ-Projective is 10m+6s while in LD-Projective is
11m+10s. In addition, λ-Projective improved H&A
to 60% in squaring and 6% in multiplication better
than LD-Projective. Their scheme was implemented
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on Sandy Bridge platform. The authors achieved
computation 69500 clock cycles through the single
core with H&A and 47900 clock cycles through the
multi core combining Gallant, Lambert, and Van-
stone, (GLV) technique, H&A and D&A in SM un-
protected. Also, they achieved computation 114800
clock cycles through single core protected. Their
scheme achieves performance better by 2% than Ivy
Bridge and 46% than Haswell platforms. In 2017,
Al-Somani [81] proposed a parallel SM method based
on Lo´pez-Dahab Projective that required 4 multipli-
cations for DBL and 16 multiplications for ADD. His
scheme applied on FPGA and AT2 processors and
obtained high speed for SM’s performance when this
scheme was implemented on eight processors with
Lo´pez-Dahab Projective.
• Using Jacobian Coordinate
This coordinate system does not require inversion
in addition formula (addition and doubling), but
uses inversion only in the final computation stage.
It is similar to Pojective coordinate (also it is an
improvement of Projective coordinate). Jacobian
provides less running time in point doubling and
more running time in point addition than Projec-
tive coordinate [64]. This system uses three co-
ordinates (X,Y, Z) and Z 6=0, which take formula
(X/Z2, Y/Z3) corresponding for Affine coordinate
[79].
Y 2Z = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6 (22)
Due to the point addition, Jacobian consumes more
computation time than other coordinate systems.
Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinate is proposed to ac-
celerate point addition in the Jacobian coordinate.
This system uses coordinates (X,Y, Z, Z2, Z3) and
saves 1m+1s in point addition [82]. This coor-
dinate has a disadvantage that point doubling is
slower than Jacobian coordinate [9]. The author
pointed out that Chudnovsky is the fastest in point
addition and modified Jacobian is the fastest in
point doubling. A Jacobian coordinate is used to
improve running time in EC exponentiation with
fixed point and random point. This coordinate is
better than Affine and Projective coordinates [64].
Also, modified Jacobian coordinate system was able
to achieve better performance than Affine, Projec-
tive, Jacobian and Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinate
systems, where Affine has addition cost (i+2m+s)
and doubling cost(i+2m+2s), Projective has addi-
tion cost (12m+2s) and doubling cost (7m+5s), Ja-
cobian has addition cost (12m+4s) and doubling
cost (4m+6s), Chudnovsky Jacobian has addition
cost(11m+3s) and doubling cost (5m+6s) and, mod-
ified Jacobian has addition cost (13m+6s) and dou-
bling cost (4m+4s) [3]. This coordinate system is
applied on EC exponentiation through prime field
(Fp160, Fp192 and Fp224). Modified Jacobian is faster
point doubling than all previous coordinate systems.
In addition, the modified Jacobian coordinate is used
to represent addition formula when ECDSA algo-
rithm is implemented as authentication protocol in
wireless on processor ARM7TDMI [2]. The authors
implemented ECDSA with Fp with different field
sizes (Fp160, Fp176, Fp192, Fp208 and Fp256) depend-
ing on standards of ANSI X9F1 and IEEE P1363.
Through results, they get running time 46.4ms for
signature generation and 92.4ms for signature ver-
ification when using Fp160. They pointed out that
their scheme improved bandwidth and storage com-
pared with previous schemes. Brown et al. [79]
pointed out that Jacobian is faster than Affine, Pro-
jective, and Chudnovsky in point doubling. Through
results, these coordinate systems improved speeding
of computation in ECC/ECDSA through reducing
execution cycle.
• Using Mixed Coordinate Systems
The mixed coordinate system uses more one coor-
dinate system to represent addition formula (which
each point uses a different system) [3, 9] to
get the best performance and least computation
time in PM. Many different mixed coordinate sys-
tems such as Jacobian-Affine, Affine-Projective, and
Chudonvsky-Affine [79].
Cohen et al. [3] pointed out that modified Jaco-
bian mixed with other coordinate systems (Jaco-
bian and Affine or Jacobian and Chudnovsky Ja-
cobian) presents a significant improvement on com-
putation time with the prime field (Fp160, Fp192 and
Fp224). Execution time is reduced using Jacobian-
Chudnovsky coordinate with prime field (when using
w=5 for Fp192, Fp224 and Fp256, and w=6 for Fp384
and Fp521). Also, Jacobian and Chudnovsky coor-
dinates improve PM performance and Chudnosky is
preferred although that requires some extra storage
(precomputation for points) [79]. Different coordi-
nate systems were investigated (Affine, Projective,
Jacobian and LD Projective) on point addition and
doubling with characteristic 3 in both Weierstrass
and Hessian forms [11]. The authors noted that Ja-
cobian is the most efficient with Weierstrass while
Projective is the most efficient with Hessian. Also,
they used mixed coordinate (Affine-Projective) on
both Weierstrass and Hessian. Through using mixed
coordinate, results indicate improved timing in ad-
dition formula. Mixed coordinate system (Affine-
Jacobian) is used to reduce m and s operations or
to avoid i operations [24]. Authors pointed out that
mixed coordinate is better performance (6%) than
Jacobian coordinate. In the mixed coordinate, point
addition consumes 8m and 3s (12 modular reduc-
tions) while point doubling consumes 4m and 4s (11
modular reductions). Also, mixed coordinate is used
with right-to-left NAF algorithm [9], where applied
Jacobian is used with point addition and modified
Jacobian with point doubling. The author pointed
out that modified Jacobian is fast in point dou-
bling but is slow in point addition; therefore, the
author used Jacobian in point addition. Through
results, this scheme presented efficiency of a scalar
by 13.33`m (where ` is bits’ length in a scalar) com-
pared with Jacobian (15.33`m) and modified Jaco-
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bian (14.33`m). But when three fields (temporary)
variables additional are used, then the left-to-right
binary method described in [3] was a better perfor-
mance. Jacobian-Affine is faster than other coor-
dinate systems in point addition. Using Jacobian
coordinate in point doubling and Jacobian-Affine in
point addition [19]. Authors pointed out that Ja-
cobian is the fastest in point doubling and mixed
coordinate is the fastest in point addition. Oliveira
et al. [78] used mixed coordinate to compute 2P +Q
where λ-Affine was used to represent P point and λ-
Projective to represent Q point. They achieved com-
putation cost less than LD-Projective. In 2017, Pan
et al. [83] indicated that mixed Jacobian-Affine co-
ordinate is more efficient than Jacobian coordinate.
They applied a mixed coordinate with ECDSA to
improve the efficiency of computation processes to
authenticate users during online registration. Their
results indicated that mixed coordinate reduces cal-
culations in both point addition and point doubling.
Table 5 shows the successive improvements of differ-
ent coordinate systems in SM such as Affine, Pro-
jective, Jacobian, and mixed coordinates.
4.3 Efficiency Improvement Via Algorithm
Simplification
This section will show some different approaches to im-
proving ECDSA performance. A set of ideas which re-
searchers used to simplify the algorithm to improve the
performance ECDSA includes removing the inversion in
the generation of the signature and the signature verifi-
cation, a collection of signatures, using a few keys and
using two points instead of shared three curved points.
ECDSA algorithm is mainly used to provide integration,
authorisation, and non-repudiation depending on servers’
CA (certification authority) [84]. The authors added an
ID, ECDSA threshold and trust value with the public
key to authorise node to gain access to the information.
Also, it was stated that data transmission of ECDSA in
the wireless sensor network (WSN) consumes more en-
ergy than computation operations [85]. To reduce energy
consumption, in data transmission, all encrypted data
aggregated from all sensor nodes are directly sent to the
Base station without decryption. This operation leads
to reducing energy consumption and increasing network
lifetime. Encryption and signing algorithms are used for
the collected data [86, 85]. Encryption algorithm EC-OU
(Elliptic Curve Okamoto-Uchiyama) is used to maintain
confidentiality and ECDSA algorithm to maintain inte-
gration, both algorithms are used during homomorphic.
The idea behind this scheme is that encryptions, signa-
tures and public keys gathered together from all nodes
are sent to aggregator (CH), then these aggregators are
forwarded to the top level (parent aggregators) and so on
up BS, that is, it is not the decryption or signature verifi-
cation in the aggregators, but these processes are carried
only in BS, that has a high capacity. The authors con-
cluded that this scheme offers energy and time efficiency
due to a collection of encryptions and signatures that are
sent to the BS. Also, this scheme avoids the signature
verification process that takes more time than the sig-
nature generation. In addition, it is efficient for large
networks. Also, ECDSA algorithm was investigated in
detail [16], and contains some of the problems that were
related to using inversion processes in generation and ver-
ification of the signature. An inversion process consumes
a great deal of time, which affects the calculation. This
process consumes 10 times the multiplication process. In
this scheme, the inversion process was removed, and the
results demonstrated that this scheme is more efficient
than the original ECDSA scheme. It had less time and
therefore less computation and energy. This scheme was
applied to the sensor node Micaz.
Using a few keys saved energy, memory and reduced the
computation in ECDSA algorithm [87]. Researchers used
ECDSA to secure the connection between the gateway
and the cluster head(CH), and CH and nodes. This
scheme broadcasts only session keys (km), which reduces
energy, as the session keys are deleted after their ac-
count. This operation leads to less memory (only a few
keys stored in memory). The public key of the gate-
way does not require power, and calculation processes
are accomplished through the use of a random number
and hash function that require less computation opera-
tions. This scheme used periodic authentication in ses-
sion key. Therefore, it prevents attacks and is appro-
priate for environments of constrained-source. Finally,
modified ECDSA algorithm is proposed through using
two curve points publicly (public key Q and point of
signature verification (x, y)) [88], where the base point
G becomes the private point. In this algorithm, s pa-
rameter only is used (without using r parameter) thus
removing r overheads. The authors pointed out that the
modified ECDSA algorithm is less complex (more per-
formance) using less number of PMs, point addition and
point doubling than original ECDSA algorithm.
5. Security Improvement on ECDSA
In this section, we will consider the security in the
ECDSA algorithm. A list of mechanisms for improving
the security in ECDSA is given. In the beginning, we will
come across types of attacks, security requirements and
countermeasures by categorizing them into non-physical
and physical attacks, as each category includes passive
and active attacks. We then will offer security mecha-
nisms to enhance and protect ECDSA’s signatures from
tampering.
5.1 Categories of Attacks
First of all, we give a review of the attacks that threaten
the security level in the ECDSA algorithm. Attacks
are becoming increasingly sophisticated, so at the same
time there should be countermeasures against such at-
tacks. But these countermeasures are expensive in terms
of time, storage, and complex computations. Also, it is
difficult to develop a countermeasure for each attack [89].
When the ECDSA algorithm was implemented, it needed
to use countermeasures against known attacks [4]. The
use of standard criteria to credible organizations such as
IEEE, ISO, NIST, NSA, FIPS, and ANSI is extremely
important to prevent many attacks. Namely, the abnor-
mal curves are weak for attacks. In addition, the pa-
rameters’ validation of ECDSA leads to strong security
16
Table 5. Improvements of different coordinate systems
Paper Coordinate system
Subsequent improvements of
SM (PA and PD)
Coordinate formula Field
[64] Affine
1i+2m (PA) and 1i+2m (PD)
m is less than Projective
(X,Y ) Fp
[79, 13] Traditional Projective
12m (PA) and 7m (PD)
i is removed
91% is faster than Affine
(X/Z,Y/Z)
Fp
(192,224,256,384,521)
[80] LD-Projective
17% (SM) is better than
traditional Projective
(X/Z,Y/Z2) F2m
[73]
Traditional Projective
LD-Projective
13m (PA) and 7m (PD)
14m (PA and 4m (PD)
(X/Z,Y/Z)
(X/Z,Y/Zˆ2)
F2m
(163,233,283)
[78] λ-Projective
LD-Projective:
13m (PA) and 11m (PD)
λ-Projective:
11m (PA) and 10m (PD)
(X/Z,L/Z) F2254
[81]
LD-Projective with
parallel SM
Improved SM execution time (X/Z,Y/Z2) F2163
[79, 13] Traditional Jacobian 12m (PA) and 4m (PD) (X/Z2,Y/Z3)
Fp
(192,224,256,384,521)
[9] Chudnovsky Jacobian 11m (PA) and 5m (PD) (X,Y, Z, Z2,Z3) F2m
[3, 2] Modified Jacobian 13m (PA) and 4m (PD) (X,Y ,Z,aZ4) Fp (160,192,224)
[11] Affine-Projective
Weierstrass form:
9m (PA) and 1i+2m (PD)
Hessian form:
10 (PA) and 1i+5m (PD)
(X,Y ) and
(X/Z,Y/Z)
F397 and
F2163
[24] Affine-Jacobian
8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
6% is better performance
than Jacobian
(X,Y ) and
(X/Z2,Y/Z3)
Fp160
[9]
Jacobian- modified
Jacobiann
11m (PA) and 3m (PD) (X/Z2, X/Z3) F2m
[19, 83]
Jacobian-Affine and
Jacobian
8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
(X,Y ) and
(X/Z2, Y/Z3)
Fp (224,256)
[78]
λ-Projective
and λ-Affine
8m (PA) and 4m (PD)
(X/Z,L/Z) and
(X,X + Y/X)
F2256
against attacks [21]. Protection of the private key (d) and
ephemeral key (k) in the ECC/ECDSA algorithm are es-
sential procedures because if an adversary could get these
the keys, the attacker is able to modify messages and
signatures and thus the ECDSA algorithm becomes use-
less. Therefore, a group of countermeasures have used to
improve security procedures. Many attacks such as sig-
nature manipulation, Bleichenbacher and restart attacks
work to retrieve the private key d or ephemeral k gen-
erator [21]. A set of conditions (the difficulty of DPL,
one-way hash, collision-resistant, k unexpected) are in-
stalled to prevent such attacks on the ECDSA. We will
classify attacks on the ECDSA algorithm for non-physical
and physical attacks. Each category includes many at-
tacks that try to penetrate the signatures of messages in
terms of integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.
We will then explain the countermeasures applied by the
researchers in their projects.
5.1.1 Non-Physical Attacks and Security Re-
quirements
These attacks do not require physical access (indirect ac-
cess) to users’ devices or the network to penetrate repos-
itories’ data or messages transferred between the clients
and server. The attackers have used different strategies
for physical attacks such as sniffing, spoofing, eavesdrop-
ping, and modification to break signatures and encoders
transmitted through radio frequency signals or the Inter-
net [90]. They implement non-physical threats to pen-
etrate the security requirements of confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability (CIA) during the implementation
of analysis and modification operations. Non-physical at-
tacks can use network devices indirectly. For example,
a DDoS attack uses network devices to send a stream of
messages to disable the server services [91]. These attacks
are categorized into passive and active attacks, according
to the strategies of these attacks and the intended target
of the attack.
5.1.1.1 Passive attacks
These attacks have used eavesdropping, monitoring, and
sniffing mechanisms to control and record the activities
of network devices, and then break user authentication
signatures without altering or destroying the data [92].
The attacker needs to adjust a large number of pack-
ets through the use of packet sniffing and packet analysis
software to assist in the analysis and penetration of signa-
tures. These attacks are primarily intended to penetrate
authentication (signatures), encryption (confidentiality),
and access control (authorisation policies). During these
attacks, the attacker tries to analyze the data to gain
information about messages such as sender and receiver
IP addresses, transport protocol such as TCP or UDP,
location, data size, and time, as this information helps
him in the penetration operation [93]. Passive attacks
do not perform any changes to the network data, but
the attacker can use these data analyses to destroy the
network in the future. This type of attack is difficult to
detect by security precautions because the eavesdropper
does not perform any data changes. But there is also
a set of security requirements that prevent such attacks.
Many research projects implement the ECDSA algorithm
to prevent the passive non-physical attack. Table 8 shows
passive non-physical attacks types in many applications
with ECDSA. A brief explanation of some of the most
popular passive attacks as follows.
• Traffic analysis and scanning (eavesdropping): Mon-
itors and analyses data as they travel over the In-
ternet or wireless network, for example, monitoring
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data size, number of connections, open ports, visi-
tor identity and vulnerabilities in operating systems
[94].
• Keylogger and snooping: Records authentication ac-
tivities in victim devices during keystrokes monitor-
ing of username/password [95].
• Tracking: Records and traces users’ information
such as location for network devices and personal
information such as name, address, email, and age
[96].
• Guessing: The attacker attempts to guess a user’s
credential by relying on words like dictionary attack
or a combination of symbols (probabilities) such as
brute force attack to gain access to the network [97].
5.1.1.2 Active attacks
An active attacker performs data penetration of users’
identities by creating, forging, modifying, replacing, in-
jecting, destroying, or rerouting messages as these mes-
sages move through the network’s nodes or the Internet
[93]. This type of attack can use sniff attack (passive at-
tack) to collect information and then performs changes
or destruction of network data. For instance, a mali-
cious attacker intercepts money transfer messages in e-
banking applications and then implements adding and
deleting operations to obtain personal gains [95]. An ac-
tive attacker can send false or fake signals to deceive the
network nodes by linking to the fake server and then
redirecting nodes’ packets to the legitimate server after
modifying the data or authentication messages. Secu-
rity requirements are significantly important, in particu-
lar, the authentication and integrity requirement, to pre-
vent many attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM)
and replay [98]. According to many research projects
in [83, 99, 100, 20, 101], ECDSA’s signatures is a secu-
rity solution to prevent many attacks such as modifica-
tion, spoofing, denial, and cyber. Figure 2 shows the
classification of non-physical attacks. Table 8 shows ac-
tive non-physical attacks types in many applications with
ECDSA. A brief explanation of some of the most popular
active attacks is given in the following.
• Spoofing: Many types of attacks such as MITM, re-
play, routing, and hijacking. The attacker intercepts
and modifies credential messages to gain access to
the network by MITM attack, while in replay at-
tacks, the attacker intercepts messages and resends
them later [97]. Also, routing/hijacking changes the
packets paths (changing the IP address) by exploit-
ing the vulnerability in the routing algorithms used
to find the best path for moving packets [93] such as
IP-spoofing and ARP-spoofing.
• Denial: These attacks are categorized as denial
of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service
(DDoS). In DoS, the attacker uses his own devices to
prevent the server from providing services to network
members. This attack targets security requirements
(CIA), while in DDoS the attacker uses his own de-
vices as well as network devices to quickly destroy
the network [96, 93, 98, 92].
• Cyber: An attacker creates websites such as phish-
ing attacks or social pages for Facebook and Twit-
ter, such as social media attacks, to trick the user
into believing that these websites are legitimate web-
sites or pages. The user enters his/her confidential
information such as username, password and card
number in these counterfeit websites to allow this
information to be accessed by the hacker [95, 97].
• Modification: This attack changes, delays, rear-
ranges users’ data packets after gaining the at-
tacker’s access as a legitimate user or the attacker
may be a legitimate member of the network (internal
attack). Any change to this data can cause problems
for the user such as changing medical or diagnostic
reports in e-health applications [96].
5.1.1.3 Security Requirements
The ECDSA algorithm provides three security require-
ments: authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation.
But integrating the ECDSA algorithm with security
mechanisms such as encryption and authorisation pro-
vides many security requirements (such as confidential-
ity, authorisation, availability, accountability, forward se-
crecy, backward secrecy, auditing, scalability, complete-
ness, anonymity, pseudonymity, and freshness) when
used in applications like e-health, e-banking, e-commerce,
e-vehicular, and e-governance. We will provide a brief ex-
planation of the security requirements that provided by
ECDSA as in the following.
• Authentication has been used to authenticate legiti-
mate users or data in the network to prevent anyone
else from accessing it. Namely, if the users’ iden-
tities or data is a trusted source in the network it
is accepted, but if an unknown source it is ignored
[102]. Many attacks such as brute-force, keylogger,
and credential guessing attempt to penetrate the sig-
natures’ authentication service.
• Integrity has been used to ensure that the transmit-
ted data has not been tampered with or edited by
the adversary [92]. Many attacks such as MITM,
replay, hijacking, and phishing attempt to penetrate
the signatures’ integrity service.
• Non-repudiation has been used to detect the com-
promised nodes via the sender who cannot deny his
message [98]. Many attacks such as repudiation,
masquerading, and social media attempt to pene-
trate the signatures’ non-repudiation service.
5.1.2 Physical Attacks and Countermeasures
Physical attacks are passive or active attacks. The at-
tacker applies a passive physical attack to analyse the sig-
natures and breaks the authentication property (gets the
private key) to become a legitimate user in the network.
On the other hand, the active physical attack attempts
to penetrate the integrity or non-repudiation property to
change signatures and messages transferring between the
network’s nodes. Many physical attacks have applied on
ECC/ECDSA. These attacks exploit some problems in
these algorithms in order to access the private key [4, 43].
These problems include:
• The power consumption
• Electromagnetic radiation
• Computation time
• Errors
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Figure 2. Classification of non-physical attacks
5.1.2.1 Passive attacks
This type of attacks do not tamper with or modify the
data but analyses the leaked bits of data (such as the
scalar’s bits). These attacks take advantage of the dif-
ferent running time for operations, power consumption
and electromagnetic radiation. The attacker tries to get
some bits leaked from k to produce the full value of k.
The attacks that exploit the power consumption and elec-
tromagnetic radiation to detect k are called side channel
attacks (SCAs). SCA attacks consist of a suitable model,
power trace, and statistical phase [4]. In these attacks,
the attacker monitors the power consumption and ex-
ploits the unintended outputs (side-channel outputs on
the secret key) of the device [13]. Leakage power con-
sumption is divided by the transition count leakage and
Hamming weight, where the first depends on the state
variable bits at a time, while the second depends on the
number of 1-bits treated in time [103] by tracking volt-
ages of the device. SCA uses many methods to detect k
bits such as the analysis of the distinction between the
addition formula operations, creation of a template, sta-
tistical analysis, re-use values, special points, auxiliary
registers, and the link between the register address and
the key [43] (passive attack is described in Figure 3).
SCA attacks (passive) consist of four major attacks:
• Simple power analysis (SPA)
In this attack, the attacker relies on a single trace
of power consumption to detect the secret key bits.
The attacker extracts these bits based on power
consumption discrimination in the addition formula
(point addition (PA) and point doubling (PD))
[13, 43].
• Timing attack
In this attack, the attacker relies on the analysis
of the execution time of the addition formula and
the arithmetic operations [69]. For example, the at-
tacker analyses the processing time for PA and PD;
if the processing time is greater, it is considered PA
(”1”) or else PD (”0”), and repeats the process until
he/she obtains all ephemeral bits k.
• Template attack
In this attack, the attacker creates templates with
a large number of traces of the controlled device.
It uses multivariate normal distribution to detect
the key based on power consumption during data
processing. The attacker gets the ECDSA’s key
by matching the best template with these traces
[43, 104].
• Deferential power analysis (DPA)
In this attack, the attacker uses many traces in a sta-
tistical analysis of power consumption. The attacker
uses hypothetical points in SM with stored recorded
results. He/she then compares these results with
the power consumption of the controlled device to
obtain a valid guess in the detection of secret key
bits [105].
General countermeasures have used to prevent passive
physical attacks [41]:
• Elimination of relation between data and leakages.
• Elimination of relation between fake data and real
data.
The implementation of one of the former two countermea-
sures ensures data protection from attacks. Jacobi form
has been proposed instead of Weierstrass to prevent SCA
attacks [106]. This form allows for addition formula op-
erations to have identical time and power and this leads
to prevention of SPA and DPA attacks. Unfortunately,
this scheme is 70% less efficient than the original scheme
(Weierstrass). The average of field operations in their
scheme is 3664 while in the original scheme it is 2136.
Many recommendations have been presented with PM’s
endomorphisms to protect many attacks such as Pohlig-
Hellman and Pollard’s rho through n ≥ 2160, #E(Fq) 6= q
and n is not dividable on qi−1 when 1 ≤ i ≤ 20 [65]. Sim-
ilarly, a study presented DSA and ECDSA algorithms in
detail and discussed that these algorithms become un-
suitable for signing messages (integrity) if applied in-
correctly, as this study has focused on the parameters
validation of DSA/ECDSA to ensure strong security for
these algorithms against different attacks; also, the au-
19
Figure 3. SCA (passive) attacks
thor proved that these algorithms become strong if the
parameters are well-validated [21]. In addition, Dimitrov
et al. [56] proposed protection mechanisms with double-
base chains method against SCA attack (SPA and DPA),
using side channel atomicity against SPA and randomiza-
tion method against DPA [107]. Also, right-to-left NAF
algorithm was proposed without precomputations and in-
vestigated security [9]. This algorithm protected against
SPA, DPA, and doubling attacks through using atomic-
ity technique countermeasures.
Implementation of template based SPA attack in ECDSA
was investigated with microprocessor 32-bit (ARM7 ar-
chitecture) [104]. The authors pointed out that this at-
tack is applicable on ECDSA through three basics (few
bits to retrieve k by lattice attack, using fixed base point
and microprocessors enough to build templates) to com-
bine with their attack. Furthermore, Mohamed et al.
[69] presented a scheme dependent on combining comb
method with width-wNAF. But, this scheme is not re-
sistant to SCA attacks. Therefore, they suggested using
constant runtime to prevent SPA and timing (through
add point of infinity (O) when bits value equal nonzero
and also add it to precomputation values). Physical
attacks are explained on ECC/ECDSA algorithms [43].
The authors described many SCA attacks, as they pre-
sented countermeasures and recommendations to apply
ECC/ECDSA such as adding randomness, countermea-
sures selection, and implementation issues to prevent
these attacks. Moreover, Rafik and Mohammed [13] anal-
yse SPA and DPA attacks (DPA analysis neglected be-
cause it is not viable in the ECC/ECDSA algorithm but
SPA is applicable to ECDSA in WSN). DPA is not appli-
cable in the case random scalar but is applicable in the
case using it against secret key (d) where the attacker
knows signed message [104]. SCA attack is working on
the use of information leaked from the SM (Q = kP ).
They concluded that protecting the ephemeral k is im-
portant in ECDSA against SPA attacks.
Template attack with lattice attack is presented to re-
trieve ECDSA’s private key over prime field (Fp160) [108].
The authors pointed out that endomorphism curves can
be penetrated by Bleichenbacher attack through using
one bit of bias. They had a secret key for ECDSA
through few number of hours when using 233 signatures,
233 memory and 237 time. Varchola et al. [4] focused
on the analysis of correlation power analysis (CPA) at-
tack on ECDSA algorithm in FPGA. They did not use
traditional power models (Hamming weight/distance) in
the analysis of CPA attack but used another type as a
countermeasure (chosen plaintext attack). They proved
possible successful feasible CPA in ECDSA on FPGA in
case k−1(e + rdA) or k−1e + (k−1dA)r, but also CPA
attack had no impact in ECDSA in case using equation
k−1e+(k−1r)dA (Results obtained by DISIPA platform).
Also, a SPA attack was suggested for SM penetration
based on conditional subtraction of a modular multiplica-
tion. Constant time of modular multiplication is a guar-
antor to prevent this attack from SM analysis. On the
other hand, Liu et al. [109] used secure-SM with random-
ized point coordinates to prevent SPA, DPA, and ZPA.
Table 6 shows the passive physical attacks and counter-
measures.
5.1.2.2 Active attacks
There is another type of SCA attack, which uses errors
to reveals some bits k, called fault attacks. This type
of attack exploits the error in the dummy operations,
memory block, invalid point and curve, and the differ-
ence between right and wrong results. The attacker gets
an error signature by adding one bit to the generator
k. This type of attack is considered a serious risk to
ECC/ECDSA algorithms if no proper countermeasures
have applied for applications and data transfer environ-
ment (Figure 4 shows active SCA attacks). SCA attacks
(active) consist of main three attacks:
• Safe-error based analysis
In this attack, the attacker uses faults to exploit
dummy operations (used to resist SPA) and mem-
ory blocks (register or memory location). Safe-error
includes two types of c safe-error and m safe-error,
where the first exploits the vulnerability of the algo-
rithm whereas the second exploits the implementa-
tion [41, 110].
• Weak-curve based analysis
In this attack, the attacker tampers with the curve
parameters, where the error is injected by using an
invalid point and invalid curve at a specified time for
the parameters that were not correctly selected or
validated. The attacker uses the errors to move SM
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Table 6. Passive physical attacks and countermeasures
Paper Passive physical attack (s) Countermeasure (s) Year
[106] SPA/DPA Jacobi form 2001
[65]
Pohlig-hellman, Pollard’s raho
Semaev-Satoh-Smart, Weil pairing
and Tate pairing
Parameters selection 2001
[21] Bleichenbacher and restart Parameters validation 2003
[56]
[9]
[107]
SPA/DPA/doubling
Side channel atomicity
and randomization
2005
2008
2017
[104]
[13]
Template/DPA
SPA/DPA
Random base point
Secure-SM
DPA-resistant
Random scalar
2008
2013
[69] SPA/timing constant runtime 2012
[43]
SPA/DPA/CPA/template
RPA/ZPA
Adding randomness
appropriate countermeasure
selection depend on the
application and environments
2012
[108] Template with lattice Large prime finite 2014
[4] CPA k−1e+ (k−1r)dA 2015
[105] SPA
Constant time modular multiplication,
point blinding, random Projective
2015
[109] SPA/DPA/ZPA
Secure-SM with randomized point
coordinates
2017
from the strong curve to the weak and thus retrieves
the private key [111, 43].
• Differential fault analysis (DFA)
In this attack, the attacker compares the difference
between the correct and fault results to retrieve the
scalar bits. Differential fault includes two types:
classic DFA and sign change FA [43, 112]. Valida-
tion of intermediate results and random ephemeral k
are used to prevent classic DFA attacks while Mont-
gomery ladder and verify the final results used to
prevent sign change FA attacks [41].
General countermeasures have used to prevent active
physical attacks [41]:
• Error-detection
• Error-tolerance
The former countermeasure allows the detection of the
errors that are added by the attacker whereas the lat-
ter prevents the attacker from the discovery of scaler or
private key, even after providing faults. The c safe-error
attack is described on ECDSA [110]. This attack ex-
ploits dummy operations in the addition formula. The
attacker can use errors with dummy operations to dis-
cover bits of k. In [110] they proposed the use of atomic
patterns (Verneuil and Rondepierre patterns) instead of
the dummy operations to repeal the c safe-error. Also,
Fournaris et al. [112] suggested using a residual number
system (RNS) and leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) to
prevent both differential faults (comparing the difference
between correct and fault results) and m safe-error (using
block memory errors) that are intended to retrieve bits
from ephemeral k.
An invalid point attack is carried out on a weak single
curve during application skip of faults to move the points
to weak Weierstrass curves to retrieve the private key
[111]. The authors used point validation as a countermea-
sure to prevent this attack. Since the device tests the val-
idation of the point on the curve, if it is incorrect, it gen-
erates an error message. Moreover, Bos et al. [113] pro-
posed using Edwards curves with ECDSA (FP128,192,256)
instead of Weierstrass curves to prevent weak-curve at-
tacks. They pointed out that Edwards curves provide
constant time and exception-free SM so these attacks are
not applicable. Similarly, Harkanson and Kim [6] showed
that there were safe and unsafe curves. They demon-
strated that curve25519 curve with 256-bit key length is
secure and fast.
The comprehensive survey presented information about
fault attacks on symmetric and asymmetric cryptogra-
phy algorithms [89]. The authors presented counter-
measures to this attack in different cryptography algo-
rithms. They pointed out that this attack may apply
on ECDSA, and also presented countermeasures to pre-
vent this attack on ECDSA. Their countermeasures used
against fault attacks are the addition of the cyclic re-
dundancy check (CRC) in the private key or using the
public key to verify the signature before sending it, but
this process is expensive [89]. In addition, fault attacks
and types are discussed in [43, 114]. The authors have re-
ferred to countermeasures to prevent these attacks such
as point validation and curve integrity check. Accord-
ing to [115], many countermeasures known to repel var-
ious fault attacks such as algorithm restructuring, phys-
ical protection of the device, random techniques in com-
putation processes and power consumption with inde-
pendent implementation. However, the authors noted
that fault detection, intrusion detection, algorithmic re-
sistance and correction techniques are capable of elim-
inating injection fault attacks. Furthermore, Barenghi
et al. [116] have provided a fault attack to retrieve the
private key. Their attack depended on the injection of
errors in the implementation of modular arithmetic op-
erations in ECDSA signatures. They used multiprecision
multiplication faults with scalar (k−1e+(k−2r)kd) to pre-
vent the penetration of signatures. Recently, Liao et al.
[117] discussed invasive SCA attacks such as fault attacks
with ECC algorithms (F2m). The attacker injects errors
into the victim’s device using tools such as voltage glitch
and laser. The authors pointed out that time and loca-
tion greatly affect the success of fault attacks. Therefore,
they proposed one multiplication module and one divi-
sion module to fix the timing of all operations. Table 7
shows the active physical attacks and countermeasures.
5.2 Security Improvement Via the Random
One of the problems that leads to weak security in the
ECDSA algorithm is that there is not sufficiently ran-
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Figure 4. SCA (active) attacks
Table 7. Active physical attacks and countermeasures
Paper Active physical attack (s) Countermeasure (s) Year
[89] Fault CRC and public key 2004
[114]
[43]
Fault attacks and types
Point validation, curve integrity check,
coherence check and combined curve
check
2011
2012
[115] Fault
Fault detection, intrusion,
algorithmic resistance and
correction techniques
2012
[116] Invalid point Point validation 2015
[110] C safe-error Atomic pattern 2016
[113] Weak-curve Edwards curve 2016
[112]
Differential fault and
m safe-error
RNS and LRA
(random base permutation)
2016
[116] Fault
Multiprecision multiplication
operations
2016
[117] invasive fault Fix computing time 2017
dom and thus ECDSA produces unsafe keys. The ran-
dom increase in ECDSA prevents penetration of signed
messages, whether in physical attacks or during trans-
fer messages from the source to the destination. For in-
stance, Bos et al. [1] pointed out that ECDSA used in Bit-
coin suffers from poor randomness in the signature, and
this leads to penetration of clients’ accounts by attack-
ers. Therefore, the keys should not be duplicated, and k
should not be used for more than one message. Also, the
randomness source in ECDSA is extremely important to
prevent key leakage [118]. If the randomness source is
bad this leads to the generation of a bad signature. A
bad signature allows the attacker to leak bits of the key
and thus discover the private key. Danger et al. [10], Fan
et al. [41], Fan and Verbauwhede [43] pointed out to many
countermeasures using randomization in scalar (blinding,
splitting, and group), point (blinding and coordinates),
register address, EC, and field isomorphism. This section
explains some researchers’ ideas to improve randomness
in ECDSA algorithm.
5.2.1 Random of Scalar
Point multiplication (kP ) in the ECDSA algorithm uses
a random scalar to provide strong signatures as a coun-
termeasure against modifying the data. But the use of
scalar k with weak random allows the attacker to reveal
k and then forge signatures. The scalar should be sub-
ject to several tests to prevent weak random and make it
difficult to predict scalar by the attacks. Many methods
have used to generate random scalars, such as the use of
hash functions or the use of generators.
Randomization source, Hutter et al. [32] used a SHA-1
algorithm to generate ephemeral k and to gain appropri-
ate randomness as a countermeasure against side chan-
nel attacks, where the generation of random k is accord-
ing to FIPS’s standard. They pointed out that using a
hash function with k increases signature security due to
changing k in each message. Also, in the signature al-
gorithm, they used equation s = k−1e+ (k−1r)d instead
of s = k−1(e + rd) to prevent DPA attacks. Moreover,
Nabil et al. [14] used W7 algorithm to increase random
integer k in the ECDSA algorithm, which showed that
the W7 generator is better than other generators in per-
formance and area. Also, [1] focused on the weaknesses
of ECC/ECDSA through the study of four SSH, TLS,
Bitcoin and the Austrian citizen card protocols. They
discovered that the ECDSA suffers from security weak-
ness in the same way as previous security systems. They
focused on the three points: deployment, weak keys, and
vulnerable signatures. They gathered databases belong-
ing to the four protocols and found that several cases of
repeated public keys have used in SSH and TLS. Bitcoins
suffer from several signatures that share nonces that al-
low an attacker to compute the corresponding private
keys and steal coins. The Austrian citizen card as well
suffers from a multi-use of the keys. The big problem
with the signature is insufficient randomness in generat-
ing keys or nonces in digital signatures. For example,
Debian OpenSSL. Koblitz and Menezes [119] discussed
random oracle model with ECDSA in the real world.
They pointed out this model is less dependent on random
generators of weakness and gives more flexibility with
modified ECDSA. As they explained, modified ECDSA
algorithm prevents chosen-message attacks.
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Randomization techniques, randomize with NAF was
proposed to prevent DPA attack [120]. This scheme re-
quired n/2 for a number of point addition and n+ 1 for
point doubling. The authors also proposed using ran-
domized signed-scalar with addition-subtraction multi-
plication algorithm to prevent SPA attacks. Their algo-
rithm required n+1 for both point addition and doubling.
Their scheme is resistant to timing attacks because scalar
changed in each running time depending on randomized
signed-scalar representation. They explained through ex-
perimental results that their scheme is resistant to power
attacks. In addition, Samotyja and Lemke-Rust [121]
investigated the evaluation of randomization techniques
such as scalar blinding and splitting with prime-256,
brainpool256rl, and Ed25519 curves in ECC/ECDSA.
Their results demonstrated that these techniques pre-
vent SCA attacks. However, Bhattacharya et al. [122]
investigated the application of scalar blinding and split-
ting techniques in ECC/ECDSA with asynchronous sam-
ples. They noted that these techniques are vulnerable to
branch misprediction, DPA, and template attacks. To
eliminate such attacks, they recommended applying exe-
cution independence for scalar k or implementing parallel
random branching executions. Dou et al. [107] noted that
the integration of scalar randomization and side channel
atomicity techniques is a countermeasure against SCA
attacks such as SPA and DPA. Similarly, Poussier et al.
[123] pointed out that scalar blinding is a countermeasure
against SPA.
5.2.2 Random of point representation
The random to represent the point prevents an adversary
from knowing bits in the point after its representation in
binary [103]. Several methods have implemented to rep-
resent a base point at random, such as point blinding
(add a random point to SM such as kP + R), random
coordinate systems (such as Projective and Jacobian co-
ordinates) and the use of random isomorphism.
Hedabou et al. [124] used randomness for intermedi-
ate values and special points through using randomized
linearly-transformed coordinates (RLC) to prevent re-
fined power analysis (RPA) and zero-value point (ZPA)
attacks. They proposed using randomized initial point
method (RIP) to prevent SPA and DPA attacks where
RIP uses random point (R) with point multiplication
(kP ). ESDSA is vulnerable to fault attack. Schmidt
and Medwed [125] presented a fault attack on ECDSA,
attacker modifies program flow and tries to benefit from
error result to get parts (bits) for ephemeral key k, then
performs lattice attack to obtain the private key (d). The
authors implemented this attack on point multiplication
through Montgomery ladder and D&A algorithms. The
success of this attack is probability, as this attack tries to
get on bits from k through many signatures. They used
the Jacobian coordinate system through implementation
because it is efficient. Also, the authors used countermea-
sure to fault attack through using a discrete algorithm l
in point representation (Q = (X : Y : Z; l), where modi-
fying by the adversary for point addition and point dou-
bling is detection. This scheme can prevent fault and
SCA attack (with random mask). Using randomness
point is recommended to prevent DPA attacks [56, 69].
Liu et al. [126] adopted a randomized point in PM to
protect ECDSA signatures. They pointed out that a ran-
domized point application with double-and-add-always
prevents SM’s bits from being attacked against multiple
attacks such as ZPA, SPA, and DPA. Also, point random-
ization with curve Curve448 in ECC/ECDSA applied to
transport layer security (TLS) [127]. The results of this
research indicate that this protocol offers a 224-bit secu-
rity level better than applying the Curve25519 curve with
127-bit randomization technology against SCA attacks.
Furthermore, Medwed and Oswald [104] described coun-
termeasure to prevent template based SPA attack using
randomness coordinates in DPA resistance. Also, using
verification batches reduces the total time of ECDSA ver-
ification but these batches suffer from some attacks. Ran-
domizers used symbolic computation in ECDSA batch
verification to improve security level against attacks
[128]. The authors used D&A and Montgomery ladder al-
gorithms in their scheme. They noted that using numeric
computation with randomizers in x-coordinate (D&A)
is faster and more secure than using Montgomery lad-
der algorithm in their scheme but original D&A is faster
than their scheme. Countermeasures (randomness co-
ordinate) were used to prevent implementation attacks
[129, 124, 32, 33, 130]. A randomized Projective coordi-
nate (RPC) was used as a countermeasure to prevent dif-
ferential power analysis (DPA) and template based SPA
attacks. RPC has implemented through a random appli-
cation in the Z coordinate to represent the intermediate
points in PM.
5.3 Security Improvement Via PM Methods
In Section 4, we have discussed how the PM method is
used to improve ECDSA efficiency. In this Subsection,
we will consider how the PM method is used to improve
security in ECDSA. Improvement of the efficiency of the
PM’s methods is dramatically important for ECDSA al-
gorithm, particularly when used in restricted-source envi-
ronments, but at the same time maintaining the security
of this algorithm is more important because the basic
mission of this algorithm is security through integration
of messages and protection from the modification, as well
as authentication of messages and users in the network.
Many attacks on the security of this algorithm have ap-
plied. Therefore, many ideas are presented by researchers
to improve the security of PM’s methods. PM’s method
such as D&A, Window, NAF, Comb, and Montgomery is
proposed to improve kP through reducing the number of
operations of addition and doubling. The attackers are
taking advantage of these operations (such as the com-
putation time in addition operation is longer than dou-
bling operation) to obtain a secret key or ephemeral key.
Therefore, this Section describes some of the recently im-
proved methods for PM’s security.
Liardet and Smart [106] used combining point blinding
and randomized signed window method as a countermea-
sure against SPA and DPA attacks. Also, an improve-
ment on left-to-right Window method was proposed with
standard curves such as NIST and SECG as a counter-
measure against SCA attacks [131]. The author added a
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special signed digit (−2w) to {1, 2, ..., 2w − 1} in scalar
representation in order to get addition formula operations
in the uniform formula instead of using dummy addition
that were revealed by attackers, thus preventing SCA at-
tacks. In addition, Mo¨ller [132] improved on the idea
in [131] through using right-to-left Window method with
2w-ary. This scheme avoided using fixed table (used in
[131]) through randomization Projective, where this ta-
ble allows attackers to analyze information statistically.
They used two-processor in their scheme to improve the
performance of PM through parallel. Moreover, window
and Montgomery algorithms were improved to prevent
SPA and DPA attacks [8]. The small multiple was added
to ephemeral key with the idea of [131] in window method
and combining addition and doubling operations into the
uniform formula in Montgomery method where original
Montgomery compute separately addition and doubling
operations. Improvement on fixed-base comb method
was presented against SCA attacks [124]. Furthermore,
the authors used sequence non-zero of bit-strings (i.e. re-
moving all zeros only using 1 and -1) to represent the
ephemeral key. They pointed out that their scheme costs
a little more computation time than the original comb
method.
Medwed and Oswald [104] used a double-and-add-always
algorithm to prevent SPA attacks in their scheme. Hutter
et al. [32] used Montgomery ladder algorithm to improve
PM’s performance and countermeasure against SPA at-
tacks in their scheme. Rafik and Mohammed [13] carried
out SPA on many methods for PM such as double-and-
add, window, and comb. They found comb method is op-
timal for their application to prevent SPA attacks. Their
results explained that the Secure-CM was both more ef-
ficient timely (1.57s) and secure in its implementations.
Pessl and Hutter [33] used countermeasures to prevent
implementation attacks. They used zeroless signed digit
(ZSD) with comb method to prevent simple power anal-
ysis (SPA).
Karaklajic´ et al. [133] merged the Lo´pez-Dahab method
with the Montgomery ladder. They pointed out that
their scheme provides security against FA attacks by us-
ing the Montgomery method for coherent check and high
probability detecting injected errors. Oliveira et al. [134]
have shown that the Montgomery ladder with Galbraith-
Lin-Scott (GLS) curves offers a 128-bit security level
against SCA attacks. In 2017, Feng and Li [135] have
noted that the ECC/ECDSA (256-bit) Comb method has
a bit leakage by a SPA attack. They improved the Comb
method by adding a signed representation to ephemeral
k to prevent SPA attacks completely.
6. ECDSA Applications
Recently, many applications have become available that
store and move sensitive data for users between net-
work nodes and server. These applications require
powerful encryption and signature algorithms (such as
ECC/ECDSA) to protect users’ information. We will
show the most important applications that use the
ECDSA algorithm to provide security and privacy re-
quirements for this data. Table 8 shows ECDSA and
recent applications with non-physical attacks.
6.1 Electronic-Health
E-health provides services that allow healthcare providers
and patients to share medical records across various
health centers, such as hospitals, clinics, and even the
home. These services provide facilities to improve the
health of patients. Because of efficient methods of elec-
tronically sharing patient data rather than traditional
paper-based methods, patient health data is available
anywhere and anytime for healthcare providers and pa-
tients. Health institutions and researchers are seeking
to develop these applications to improve the quality of
care, disease diagnosis, and remote medical surveillance
[138]. E-health includes many systems such as electronic
health record (EHR), electronic medical record (EMR)
and personal health record (PHR), which are used effi-
ciently to share medical records either globally (EHR)
or locally (EMR) and are administered either by the
authority provider (EHR and EMR) or by the patient
(PHR) [139]. These applications also suffer from many
problems such as complexity in computations, lack of re-
sources, precision management, and mobility. However,
the main problem that threatens the acceptance of these
systems for patients and providers is the privacy of pa-
tients’ data. This data or medical reports from WSN,
laptop, and phone to an e-health server are vulnerable to
attacks and intrusion because the Internet and wireless
network are unsafe environments.
Data privacy is a key issue for any e-application specifi-
cally for e-health applications. These applications require
security and privacy mechanisms such as authorisation
policies, encryption algorithms, and robust signatures to
protect medical repositories for patients from malicious
attacks. Many examples of security refer to threats im-
plemented against e-health:
• In 2013, there were penetration attacks on health-
care data in US hospitals. These attacks revealed
85.4% of the medical records (protected health infor-
mation (PHI)) of the 5 largest incidents for patients’
data [140].
• In 2016, Apple Health (Medicaid) was exposed for
data breach. This attack revealed 370,000 records
for clients in Apple Health (Washington state) [141].
• In 2017, an unauthorised individual penetrated
EHR the New Jersey Diamond Institute for Fertil-
ity and Menopause. The hacker revealed PHI to
14633 record containing patients’ information such
as names, birth dates, social security numbers, and
sonograms [142].
According to the Vormetic report on data security 2016,
healthcare is one of the sectors that is most vulnerable
to hackers’ attacks and thus requires increased efforts to
secure health data by 64%. This report stated on 21 Jan-
uary 2016 that 91% of enterprises suffer from vulnerabil-
ity threatening data security (internal and external at-
tacks). The study of security data included several coun-
tries such as Australia, USA and Germany [143]. There-
fore, many systems such as national e-health transition
authority (NEHTA) in Australia and health insurance
portability and accountability act (HIPAA) in the USA
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Table 8. ECDSA and applications against passive and active non-physical attacks
Paper and year
Passive non-physical
attack (s)
Active non-physical
attack (s)
Signature algorigthm
and key size
Application
[99] - 2017 -
Masquerade, MITM,
replay and target oriented
ECC/ECDSA
(160-512 bit) with
pairing cryptography
[96]- 2017
Tracking and
eavesdropping
Impersonation, replay,
MITM and cloning
ECDSA, ECDH, AES
and Shamir’s trick
E-health
(EHR, EMR,
PHR)
[95] - 2017
Shoulder surfing,
keyloggers
password-related
and direct
observation
Phishing and
data breach incidents
ECDSA (256-bit) and
SHA-256
[97] - 2017 Wifi sniffing
Phishing, impersonation,
MITM and reflection
ECDSA (224-bit) and
ECIES
E-banking
(OB, MB,
CC, ATM)
[83] - 2017 Stealthy Heartbleed
ECDSA (256-bit) to
support SIGaaS
[101] - 2017 Eavesdropping MITM
ECDSA (256-bit) with
threshold signatures
E-commerce
(Bitcoin,Litcoin,
Freicoin, Peercoin)
[20] - 2017 -
Fake entity and
position counterfeit
ECDSA (160,192,224,
256, 384, 521) with
various curves
[98] - 2017 Tracking
Modification, Sybil,
impersonation, DoS,
bogus information.
and replay
ECDSA (224-bit)
with pseudonym
E-vehicular
(V2V, V2I)
[136] - 2015
[102] - 2015
-
Private key recovery
and tampering
Signatures algorithms
(ECC/ECDSA, RSA)
with one time public
key infrastructure and
parameters selection
[137] - 2013
[100] - 2016
- Cyber ECC/ECDSA
E-governance
(G2C, G2B,
G2E,G2G)
recommended applying security and privacy in e-health
applications correctly and accurately to prevent security
threats [144].
In addition, the accuracy of medical data is critical in
diagnosing diseases and determining the condition of pa-
tients during their online or wireless transmission from
patient to a healthcare provider. Also, penetration of
the medical data with diseases such as addiction, HIV
infection, sexual and dermatological conditions can lead
to harassment, discrimination, even death of the patient
if data reports change during the transfer from client
to server [145]. These penetrations show that medical
records in e-health require a high level of security and
privacy. Many modern projects implement the ECDSA
algorithm for high security and efficient performance.
ECDSA signatures (Koblitz with the key of 163-bit) and
energy-harvesting techniques were proposed to monitor
patients’ conditions by WSN in e-health [146]. The au-
thors applied the patient’s health surveillance scenario
during the deployment of a set of sensor nodes such as
TelosB, Micaz, and MagoNode ++. They generated a
signature with a time of 300ms and an energy consump-
tion of 7mj. They concluded that these results reduce
time and energy in WSN to serve e-health applications
that deal with massive data. Masud and Hossain [99]
proposed using ECC/ECDSA to protect patients’ infor-
mation in collaborating clouds healthcare based on pair-
ing based cryptography. Also, Ibrahim and Dalkılıc¸ [96]
designed a scheme to support the privacy and security
of patients’ data in e-health. This scheme applied the
ECDSA’s signatures in the RFID tag to provide mutual
authentication in the protection of medical records. They
pointed out that their scheme is capable of preventing
man-in-the-middle attacks, tracking, eavesdropping, im-
personation, replay, and cloning. They used the Shamir
scheme to reduce the cost of PM in signature verification
(ECDSA) as well as security support. Their scheme pro-
vided fewer calculations and more security in the process
of authentication of medical records in e-health.
6.2 Electronic-Banking
E-banks have used the personal information of their cus-
tomers to authorise access to their bank accounts. Many
systems have applied for dealing with bank accounts such
as online banking (OB), mobile banking (MB), credit
card (CC) [147] and automated teller machines (ATM)
which require signature algorithms to protect confiden-
tial information for customers. E-banking implements a
set of security measures to prevent hackers and Inter-
net thieves. Hackers are trying to create a gap in these
systems to hack users’ accounts. They have applied high-
tech to penetrate customers’ credits. Therefore, the pro-
cess of authentication for legitimate users in e-banking
applications is extremely important. Many examples of
security refer to threats implemented against e-banking
applications:
• In 2012, millions of clients blocked access to their
accounts at the Royal Bank of Scotland [148].
• In 2015, the website www.000webhost.com was
hacked by a malicious attack. The result was the
attacker’s access to 13 million user accounts; the
hacked data contained personal information for cus-
tomers (such as name and plaintext password) [95].
• In 2016, DDOS attacks were perpetrated against
HSBC bank, which is one of the biggest banking
names in the world; these attacks led to the suspen-
sion of service for two days and prevented customers
from accessing their accounts [148].
In the current era, authentication systems based on user-
name/password are no longer safe in protecting user
accounts [95]. We have investigated the adoption of
ECDSA signatures in modern e-banking applications and
their ability to prevent hacking threats. In 2017, Al-
hothaily et al. [95] proposed a scheme to protect e-
banking applications. They designed a protocol to au-
thenticate customers in e-banking applications. Also,
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they pointed out that their scheme prevents e-banking
attacks such as phishing, shoulder surfing, keyloggers,
data break accidents and password-related attacks. Their
scheme relied on the ECDSA (256-bit) algorithm with
SHA-256 to sign the ticket. This ticket implements secu-
rity mechanisms to protect users’ accounts such as one-
time username, session key, ticket validity period, times-
tamp and add account permission for each login opera-
tion. They pointed out that their scheme provides pro-
tection against previous attacks as it prevents reuse of
credits. Moreover, Bojjagani and Sastry [97] discussed
that short message service (SMS) is not reliable in e-
banking applications. These applications exchange these
messages with their customers in a dense and daily way
over the Internet or wireless network. They proposed a
model for protecting bank messages by using ECDSA (p-
224) and the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme
(ECIES). They integrated the ECIES algorithm with sig-
nature verification in ECDSA to support the authenti-
cation process in e-banking applications. Their model
achieves three stages (authentication, transaction, and
notification) to complete the authorisation process be-
tween sender and receiver. They pointed out that their
scheme is efficient and reliable for real-time banking ap-
plications, against the attacks of wifi sniffing, reflec-
tion, replay, man-in-the-middle, phishing, and imperson-
ation, and provides end-to-end communication security
between the client and server. They demonstrated that
the ECC/ECDSA algorithm provides high performance
in e-banking applications because these algorithms use
small keys and an appropriate computation cost for these
applications compared to other public key algorithms
(such as RSA, DSA, and DH).
6.3 Electronic-Commerce
The Internet is important medium for providing ser-
vices, sharing information, buying and selling electronic
products, applications, business transactions on an in-
ternal or external e-commerce level. Business and e-
commerce transactions information have been shared be-
tween several parties, such as governments, companies,
and customers (consumers) via websites. The Internet
has brought a tremendous amount of positives but it has
also made some negatives. The most important draw-
back is hacking threats to personal and sensitive infor-
mation to get gains and benefits [83]. The progress of the
huge development of this technology has brought with it
security risks that threaten the personal information of
users and attempt to detect private keys in signing and
encrypting data. Due to a high demand for consumers
and companies to market products online, e-commerce
requires secure signature algorithms and is efficient to
deal with tens of thousands of requests per second. Many
examples of security refer to threats implemented against
e-commerce:
• In 2016, the report in [149] pointed out that many
popular websites have been hacked by credential re-
play attacks (password reuse) for more than three
billion user accounts. Fraud attacks on e-commerce
in the united states are expected to hit $7 billion by
2020.
• In 2016, phishing attacks target e-commerce where
44% of threaten customers and 11% of public activ-
ity [150].
• In 2017, the study of IP converge data services (IPC)
stated that more than 16,600 DDoS attacks were re-
vealed on e-commerce deals particularly on Valen-
tine’s Day and Chinese New Year [151].
Many currency signing systems have used in e-commerce
applications such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Freicoin and Peer-
coin [152]. Most of these systems implement ECDSA
signatures to support security features (authentication,
integrity, and non-repudiation). A scheme to secure
e-commerce and online transactions was proposed in
[83]. The authors developed a graphic processing unit-
universal elliptic curve signature server (Guess) with the
adoption of the ECDSA signature mechanism (key of 256-
bit binary) to provide signatures with high-performance
computations. They applied signature as a service
(SIGaaS) on an enterprise private cloud (EPC) to se-
cure e-payment over the Internet. They pointed out that
the Internet is an insecure medium because of the va-
riety of attacks that try to hack private keys. Also,
they described SIGaaS as impervious to private key at-
tacks such as heartbleed and stealthy newly emerged.
Their scheme described the authentication issues between
tenants and Guess. Therefore, they have demonstrated
that e-commerce applications require robust authentica-
tion. For instance, Chinese Alipay website fulfills huge
requests and exchanges personal information for users.
This website performs more than 85,900 transactions per
second. Therefore, this website requires an efficient sig-
nature algorithm in terms of speed, time and security
requirements to protect these transactions online. The
authors stated that the graphics processing unit (GPU)
with ECDSA showed high performance and security in
dealing with e-commerce websites such as the games mar-
ket. Furthermore, Mann and Loebenberger [101] used
ECDSA to implement two-factor authentication with e-
commerce applications (Bitcoin wallet). They imple-
mented a mutual signature protocol with signature ver-
ification over a separate communication channel. Their
scheme applied a threshold to support a set of signa-
tures, instead of one signature as well as using the hash
value in checking the payer and payee. They argued that
ECDSA and threshold signatures solved Bitcoin security
problems such as monitoring transaction details (block
chain public) and transaction size. They also pointed
out that randomization is significantly important in pre-
venting malicious attackers from discovering the secret
key in ECDSA.
6.4 Electronic-Vehicular
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) applications are im-
portant modern applications to secure people’s lives on
the road. These applications are a collection of network
cars that share information such as police, emergency,
and smart taxi cars. These applications regulate network
traffic to ensure safety for users while enforcing road laws.
Several features for VANET applications have used such
as self-regulation, distributed communications environ-
ment, and dynamic topology. These applications have
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been designed to avoid traffic congestion, prevent acci-
dents, and prevent violations of road rules. The primary
objective is to protect passengers on the road. This type
of network operates with two categories: vehicle to vehi-
cle (V2V), and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I). VANET
is a class of mobile ad hoc network (MANET) network
but it works regularly and not randomly. The critical
issue and great challenge for this type of application is
security due to the VANET network sharing nodes infor-
mation in the open medium [153]. To protect users in a
VANET network, encryption and signature mechanisms
should be used to prevent the risks of modifying mes-
sages between nodes. Many attacks threat the VANET
application such as impersonation, Sybil, modification,
DDoS and reply. To prevent these attacks the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) security require-
ments should be applied. Many examples of security refer
to threats implemented against e-vehicular:
• In 2015, a hacker successfully carried out a cyber
attack to hijack and control a Jeep car over the In-
ternet. This attack prevented the driver from taking
control of his car [154].
• In 2017, the report in [155] stated that a hacker pen-
etrated board messages for highways in California.
This hacker targeted to distract drivers and endan-
ger them. The report reported that 58.85% of at-
tacks such as DDoS, cyber and brute forcing were
rated as high risk for VANET applications.
The ECDSA algorithm was used to authenticate mes-
sages with VANET [156]. Though the results, the au-
thors noted delay generation key, signature, and verifica-
tion increase with an increase in curve size. This scheme
provides integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation,
as it is convenient for constrained-source networks. Also,
Franekova´ et al. [20] have provided a security analy-
sis of the ECDSA algorithm (key lengths of 160, 192,
224, 256, 384 and 521) with VANET (V2V) applications.
They applied many curves to the ECDSA (OpenSSL li-
brary) such as prime, pseudorandom binary, Koblitz bi-
nary. They also focused on data transfer scenarios and
used the Riverbed Modeler tool to analyze data trans-
ferred between vehicles. Their scheme discussed whether
VANET can be exposed to many attacks such as fake
entity, position counterfeit, and Sybil. To generate suf-
ficient security in these applications, at least the NIST
p-224 and NIST p-256 keys should be used in ECDSA.
They noted that the important parameters that affect the
efficiency of signatures in an e-vehicular environment are
the size and time of signature generation and verification.
They concluded that ECDSA p-224 or p-256 provides ef-
ficiency (time and size of data) and adequate security to
secure e-vehicular (V2V) applications. In addition, Ra-
jput et al. [98] argued that the privacy of location infor-
mation and identity should be safe in e-vehicular appli-
cations because changing this data could lead to fatal ac-
cidents. They applied a method of authentication based
mainly on the signatures of ECDSA with a pseudonym
to provide anonymity to the vehicular applications. Also,
they pointed out that their scheme is capable of prevent-
ing malicious attacks such as location tracking, modifi-
cation, impersonation, bogus information, Sybil, replay,
and DOS. Their scheme supports standard security re-
quirements as well as traceability and low overheads. In
their scheme, the pseudonym consists of signing ECDSA,
timestamp and a random number. They pointed out that
a lightweight pseudonym is sufficient to support security
in e-vehicular applications against malicious attacks.
6.5 Electronic-Governance
E-governance is an application that provides services to
stakeholders through various communication technolo-
gies such as Internet, SMS, and email to simplify the pro-
cedures of services for citizens, business, and government
agencies. This application consists of four types of trans-
actions involving government to citizens (G2C), govern-
ment to business (G2B), government to employee (G2E),
and government to government (G2G) [157] to deal with
various data types of stakeholders. The adoption of these
applications in society should meet a high level of citizen
confidence through a range of requirements such as flex-
ibility, transparency, accountability, manageability, good
governance, as well as trustworthy (security and privacy)
services [158]. According to a United Nations report, a
significant increase is in the development of e-governance
applications in some countries of the world, but the is-
sue that restricts their use is the security of data and the
privacy of the stakeholders (citizen, government, busi-
ness, employees, intermediaries and service providers)
against hacking attacks [159]. These applications are a
large pool of databases of diverse sources; therefore, these
applications are exposed many risks such as legitimate
users, e-government employees, foreign intelligence agen-
cies, business enterprises, terrorist organizations, soft-
ware providers, and natural disasters. Sharma and Kalra
[157] referred to several attacks against e-governance such
as DOS, insider, impersonation, replay, and offline pass-
word guessing. Many examples of security refer to threats
implemented against e-governance:
• In 2012, 112 Indian government websites such as
the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry
were hacked. The hacker stopped these websites
from working for weeks [160].
• In 2017, a cyber attack was carried out against Aus-
tralian government websites such as the Finance
Department and Australian Electoral Commission.
This attack revealed online sensitive information of
more than 50,000 records [161].
To secure citizen’s data in e-governance applications, se-
curity requirements should be applied. Several proce-
dures have used to secure the privacy of users such as
server security, network security, data security, work-
station security as well as physical and environmen-
tal security [159]. Most developed countries such as
USA, UK, and some other NATO member countries use
ECC/ECDSA to secure the privacy of citizens’ data, as
well as to protect interoperability between governments
[162] and internal communications to prevent data fraud
attacks. Jain et al. [136] have demonstrated the impor-
tance of applying public signatures to e-governance that
authenticate stakeholders in the system. The availabil-
ity of efficient digital signatures will provide a power-
ful e-authentication mechanism that will allow citizens
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to safely handle government documents (such as prop-
erty tax, income tax, license, visa, passport, and iden-
tity card services). These applications invest technologies
such as cloud computing and Big Data in dealing with
large amounts of citizen data, but also provide significant
challenges for developers of these technologies in terms of
security and privacy. Moreover, Singh et al. [102] argued
that e-governance applications store large amounts of cit-
izens’ data in various technologies such as cloud com-
puting. They proposed applying ECDSA signatures to
protect cloud computing data from change with recom-
mendations for using ECDSA with accurate parameters.
In addition, Lo’ai et al. [100], Zefferer et al. [137] have
noted that ECC/ECDSA is the best algorithm for sign-
ing and encrypting sensitive data transmitted through e-
governance applications. They also discussed that several
SCA attacks try to penetrate the private key in ECDSA.
Furthermore, they explained that there is no countermea-
sure to block all hacker attacks, but a set of countermea-
sures should be used to secure data sharing.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we made a detailed study of the security
and efficiency of the ECDSA algorithm. This study en-
abled us to see the recent improvements for ECDSA in
terms of security, efficiency, and application. This up-
dated improvement may possibly inspire some ideas to
improve some of the methods in the security and effi-
ciency of the ECDSA. We hope that this study will be
useful for researchers to locate research ideas in securing
and improving the efficiency of the ECDSA algorithm,
especially when used in the constrained source devices.
Several future works that we intend to accomplish:
• We intend to implement the ECDSA algorithm in
e-health applications to apply the integrity and au-
thentication properties to protect patients’ data by
the design of the authentication and authorisation
protocols for users in the network.
• We intend to implement lightweight curves such as
Edward curve, the Montgomery SM method, and
λ-Projective in [78] that are critical procedures to
increase the efficiency of implementing ECDSA sig-
natures in accessing a massive database of e-health.
• We intend to use lightweight hash algorithms to gen-
erate random ephemeral k and personal information
for healthcare users. These algorithms provide high
performance in computations operations.
• We intend to investigate the application of
the ECDSA algorithm with homomorphic and
anonymity mechanisms to secure source-constrained
devices data such as WSN. These devices require ef-
ficient and secure mechanisms to protect patients’
data when transferred from WSN to e-health.
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